Well put, about the design holes, Kit d'Rection KG.
I think it's those holes that the report will have to focus on.
If human error stood at the beginning of the chain or not won't make a huge learning item for the future.
Question for the AB people: What is the SOP when you realise you have no spoilers?
I might sound cynical but I'm not sure there is such a SOP... simply because it's not supposed to happen...
and yet the deployment of ground spoilers is rigidly inhibited by the governing logic.
Before the Warsaw incident, it required both squat switches to deploy full spoilers.
They've fixed that.
But the thing I still don't understand:
why not use full manual braking as an override signal for the whole ground spoiler inhibition?
Why is this logic so rigid in the first place?
Were the engineers afraid the spoilers could deploy in flight?
They would surely have to be armed to do so, no matter if in flight or on the ground.
There are situations where you would love to be able to tell the system that you know better, and this clearly was such a situation.
Any automation system will only perform those tasks that the designers could envision.
pj