Pira:
I have just finished seeing a CBT presentation on AB auto flight systems and it looks as the A/TH will do exactly what you suggested: if A/TH is disconnected with TL on CL detent, the engines will follow the TL position and accelerate. On approach, this kind of logic, may easily induce the crew to a feeling that the TL are at idle position (or almost there) as the engines will be running at lower power. The pilot had on is mind the RH REV problem and got himself ready to T/Rev the LH engine only (..." I have to remember that after touch down the RH engine should not be touched"). As there is no visual clue on TL quadrant what automation is doing at any time, I really feel that must be software changes to avoid that human factor and automation might be out of sync and cause this sort of tragedies.
In my opinion, AFT just landed, on ground, with a T/REV FULL DEPLOYED IN ONE ENGINE, IS COMMITED TO LAND. THE OPOSITE ENGINE SHOULD NEVER BE ALLOWED TO ACELERATE and BRAKING RESOURCES SHOULD BE FULL AVAILABLE TO PILOTS...in addition, the faulty REV on RH engine was known before the accident. Must be a way to tell the computer that a certain Engine Rev is INOP so that the automation follow a routine in such way that even if the pilot try to reverse a declared faulty engine it will never accept and braking capabilities are not limited....a lesson should be learned from previous tragedies, with very similar reasons.