Among the 700 posts was this brilliant exercise of pure logic:
None of this process described deals with or accomodates the broader organizational aspects which may or may not play a crucial role in creating an environment conducive to an accident. Investigations into corporate culture, training priorities and footprints, corporate predispositions and priorities (or not) to fostering a safety culture are all part of any investigation as are the immediate human factors which may have led a perfectly sentient, highly trained crew to mis-perceive or simply not see circumstances which would permit a crew to interpret an extremely high-risk event as "normal". No crew sets out to end up this way, so the human factors question which must be answered is, "what, in the moment, 'made sense' to the crew which caused them to act in the way they did?" We who sit with both time and huge amounts of data need to re-build the few seconds in which such interpretations were made by professional, highly-experienced airmen.
The perspective to get close to what made sense to the crew on that moment worth waiting for the next 700 posts.