I am not trying to speculate on the accident, but maybe shed some light on the Airbus comments, and some interesting further posts / links.
A- During the flare at thrust reduction select ALL thrust levers to IDLE.
What else can this mean but 1 TL was not retarded to idle...?
LEM's strange comment from an obvious non-pilot:
Landing an airplane with the thrust levers fully advanced is NOT natural.
I hate Airbus.
backs this up... I cannot think of any Airbus or Airbus procedure where you do not land with the TLs at idle
Subsequent posts seem to indicate a handling "issue" with 1 Rev Inop... in that the MEL states
not to select "Rev Idle" on the Inop reverser - since the engine will accelerate to "Reverse Idle" thrust - somewhat higher than "Ground Idle" and therefore provides an element of forward thrust. The HP concentrates so hard on not selecting Reverse he also forgets to idle the TL with potentially disastorous consequences on thrust (ATHR disconnets so engine goes to CLB power), Spoilers (don't deploy - and if you call Gnd Spoilers without checking...
) and Autobrake (won't deploy)... (apparently from posts above).
In BA, due to our strange role swapping system, the NHP selects Reverse. Whilst most people knock the BA system, purely by coincidence in this case it helps - the HP doesn't have to remember anything strange, and will idle all TLs prior touchdown. It is the NHP that has to "remember" to only select Rev on one side (and usually forgets - or I do anyway - and selects both!).
IF the TAM suffered from this i.e. #2 at > idle thrust, potentially CLB Pwr, #1 in Reverse, potentially full Reverse, AND no spoilers and/or autobrake, then on that runway, and wet / ungrooved, the outcome is hardly surprising. The lessons would clearly be HF based, given the previous instances... and some training and/or systems change required to prevent something I find strange to be happening, but appears not to be a "one off"...
