With less aircraft, JFH can do less. It really does appear to be a simple as that.
On 5 Jan 07, I made the following suggestion on page 99 of the
Sea Jet thread.
Without wishing to restart the argument again, I note that on several occasions in recent years a CVS has embarked a Sea Harrier squadron AND a Harrier GR7 one, giving fifteen or sixteen jets to deal with as well as some helicopters. Now it seems unlikely that two GR7/9 units could embark at the same time, so the maximum number of jets on board would be six to eight.
Yet CVF will mean that flight deck personnel will have to deal with up to 42 jets.
If the aircraft sent down to SFDO at Culdrose are well looked after, then they could be used on occasion to give experience of having a crowded hangar and flight deck, in the years prior to CVF entering service.
Now it appears the number of embarked aircraft will often be zero, so perhaps this suggestion isn't so daft? Certainly cheaper than a GR9 going over the side due to lack of flight deck crew experience.
A few months ago I was talking to a Killick Chockhead. He did mention the problem of skill fade during the next few years, with the problem of the experienced ones leaving, so that when CVF arrives there are few with much experience of fixed wing operations.
As for pilots - I have mentioned before than in 1995 or 96 I read in
Navy News that the Navy had about fifty Sea Harrier pilots (at the time they were doing back to back Adriatic deployments, which may have lead to morale problems). How many fixed wing pilots does the RN have now? Why has this number dropped? Why did nobody notice when it started to fall?
Another question: What if a future operation, conflict or crisis involves an enemy with an air force or a navy, ie a country that has not been subject to ten years of economic sanctions, and is not landlocked? It seems that the current thinking is that we do not not need the means to deal with airborne or seaborne threats.