Here's one suggestion. Dissolve JFH. Take the two navy squadrons and take them back to Yeovilton and place them on naval tasking.
I echo Engine's comments about using Tornados in Afghanistan.
But therein lies the problem Navaleye. There are not 2 naval (heavy) GR7/9 sqns because the RN can't man them.
The GR4s are not in Afghanistan because they are commited to TELIC and the GR7 was better suited to HERRICK when the initial deployment was to an austere base. Typhoon is scheduled to replace Harrier next year in Khandahar. Personally, I think the Typhoon would be better suited to Iraq, which would free up the GR4s to replace the Harriers in HERRICK, but that's above my pay grade.
Jags were examined to deploy to Afghanistan but funding issues got in the way and the fleet was canned early.
In fairness to the FA2 guys, they probably focused upon A-A because the jet was realistically not capable of A-G work. Lacking PGMs or a designator pod, it would have been forced to adopt (albeit accurate) dive attacks, or low level delivery. I would suggest that modern base alt, ROE, PID and CDE issues effectively preclude such tactics given typical weather.
Navaleye suggests that JFH has been a disaster for the RN. The same could arguably be said for the RAF, and more importantly Joint capability. Prior to JFH, three RAF GR7 sqns maintained around 8 years (95-03?) of constant ops over N Iraq, Bosnia or Kosovo. When they were doing Iraq, the Jags (who themselves had been in Bosnia since 94) would do Yugoslavia and vice versa. Meanwhile, the GR1s worked southern Iraq. Since the division of assets with the RN, JFH has seemingly struggled to maintain a single det in Khandahar since 04.
If JFH has hurt RN maritime capability, it seems to have denuded RAF CAS capability also.
Regards,
MM