OK Basil - I can think of two. GulfAir and ArmAvia. I do not know if you fly the Airbus - I suspect not. If you read the report it is patently obvious that the instruction to discontinue the approach was very poorly executed. I'm not having a go at the crew or the obvious CRM issues - but the facts are that the aircraft was operated in a totally non standard way in contravention of the FCOM.
There may well have been "mode confusion" - but that's not unique to Airbus and I'm not going to turn this into a A versus B debate - somotogravic illusion is not type specific!!! Personally I think the non moving THR LVR's is a red herring. In 10 years it has never caused me a problem as there are aural and visual cues to tell you what's happening.
I think the primary confusion was the overspeed warning because the flaps had not been retracted on the go-around - hence retarding the levers (albeit briefly). The crew went from a low energy situation ("SPEED SPEED SPEED"), which they reacted to correctly, to an overspeed (due flaps) in a short period of time - confusing yes, but entirely avoidable IF they had followed the standard procedures/FCOM. The susequent actions upto impact point to a total breakdown of SA.....
It's easy I know sitting here but it does re-enforce that you MUST be prepared for the unexpected. IF you are told to "turn right heading 240° and climb 2000'" whilst fully configured on the ILS at 3 miles just EXACTLY HOW are YOU going to achieve that? This is something I put to my trainees and if anything it emphasises that whilst in essence it's straightforward you do need to THINK about what you are going to do and the order in which you are going to do it.
As with all accidents / reports, I hope we can all learn something from this one - as I said earlier, recommended reading.
A4