Da4orce
“Lets hope that the press and 'MOD insiders' are wrong in attributing the ignition source in XV230 to a hot air duct failure otherwise there have to be serious questions asked as to whether the failure could have been prevented by the implementation of a maintenance programme as recommended some two years prior to the loss of XV230 along with 200 years of combined RAF experience in the shape of crew 3”.
While I don’t know anything at all about this aspect of Nimrod, this is precisely what I was advocating a few posts ago. We often read BOI reports which present recommendations as novel ideas (look how honest and clever we are), yet scrape away the thin veneer and you find that very serious issues have been known about for years and ignored. You never see this mentioned in the reports, and it more or less follows that it never gets raised at Coroners’ inquests. That is, MoD can tailor the BOI report to avoid embarrassment, and effectively pre-determine the inquest verdict. I have chosen my words very carefully. There are cases where the problem has been known about, but not fixed for good reason following a risk assessment. But very often it is swept under the carpet as to fix it would embarrass senior staffs or “chosen ones” who have waived safety in order to meet time and cost targets. Remember, this has been condoned in the past by CDP and above.
If you want to check what I’m saying, have a look at the BOI reports from previous fatal “accidents” during GW2. Redacted versions are on the MoD site. Look at the recommendations. One calls a certain system “not fit for purpose” as it blinds and disorientates the pilots, yet the obvious questions - “So who, and what flawed process, allowed it to be fitted in the first place?” and “Why was it removed, and then refitted?” are not asked. Nor were they, apparently, by the Coroner. This is not a state secret. You just have to be able to assimilate open source data from various sources, not just what the MoD wants you to read. (In this case, a picture speaks a thousand words). Or another report which recommends a safety feature is actually integrated properly, so it works. Instead of leaving it at that, why not ask why it wasn’t integrated in the first place, leaving the a/c unsafe, and whether or not the problem had been flagged (rumour has it) 9 months and 3 years before the “accident”, both times to 2*. And whether the same problem had occurred on other a/c requiring precisely the same safety features. And why they were fixed.
If you ask each IPT about these “accidents” they will invariable trot out some stats that show it to be an isolated case on their a/c. Stovepiping in MoD means they are blissfully unaware of cases with similarities or common denominators. Visibility of all the cases I mention only comes at 2* level, minimum. Precisely the level that has ruled safety is optional on these a/c. Well, they’re not going to dob themselves in to a BOI comprising minions, are they?
The solution? Simple application of what are, supposedly, mandated rules. The relevant Def Stan is extant. It hasn’t really needed amending for 17 years, partly because it’s so robust; but mainly because it’s fallen into disuse as its purpose – maintaining the build standard, including safety - is poorly funded and widely ignored.
Do I have faith in BOIs? No. But I do think matters will gradually improve, as the penny has dropped with MoD that the internet and FOI, along with the likes of TD, can be a force for good.