CS wrote
I have the utmost respect for everyone who was on crew 3, but the crews that remain must be allowed to get on with their work without all this added pressure
Hear hear! So let's alleviate that pressure, CAS, and institute these safety mods that are so obviously required to this very important component of the UK military air fleet. I find it alarming that the shortcomings in the airworthiness of front line operational types (Nimrod, Hercules, Chinook) are seen as unacceptable, not by the MOD, nor by the Senior Commanders of the RAF, but by those at the work face, both serving and ex, and honourable examples such as Tucumseh who can tell us how the system throws up scandals such as these and then perpetuates them. His quote tells us of the extent of this scandal:
The exception was always safety issues. Until 1991 of course, when as a matter of policy funding was no longer automatically available to investigate/rectify safety problems. As I’ve said elsewhere, we were routinely instructed to ignore safety problems. This is still the case.
In 1965 Hastings TG577 crashed on take off at Abingdon for a training paras drop. All 41 on board died. The entire world wide fleet was grounded, and an expensive and extensive repair of the aircraft tails initiated. Within 3 years that transport fleet was gone, in favour of the Hercules, but safety was paramount. A far more expensive mod was of course done to the Concordes after the tragedy at CDG, only to be followed by their complete withdrawal within a few years. These actions were not wasteful and reckless expenditures, but the proper and prudent reaction to technical deficiencies that had caused or augmented the causes of aircraft accidents. To do otherwise is unprofessional and reckless. It seems that policy has been to do otherwise for some 16 years. That is a scandal!