We seem to be long on
opinion here and short on
good facts....
Adding to the former, I'd like to suppose that there is good reason for what seems to be a fairly industry-standard paradigm when dealing with engine failures once airborne.
To my mind, the supporting evidence for the evolved methodology ought to be in the public domain, accessible to each and every one of us professional pilots.
This evidence is the litmus test that justifies/underpins the manufacturer's SOP.
It's also going to be extremely helpful to me if I'm ever in the dock.
I'd like to see more discussion on
V1 spreads. I'd hazard a guess a high percentage of runways most pilots operate from (except those which are field length limited - and even then you may not be limited by the single engine no-go case) have V1 spreads, and that, a high percentage of time, one is not operating up against the limiting case.
It is an added layer of complexity but its extra time available for your decision-making.
I'm quite happy to concede the contrary, especially if the evidence warrants the case, but of course, evidence of successful RTO's in excess of V1 is always likely to be hushed up isn't it?
In fact I can't recall any I've read about....
More training would always be something I'd vote for.
The 80/260 reversal, OEI, low level, FD off (obviously)
is something I've tried and like
BOAC says, it makes you shudder!
