212 - of course TCAS 1 would have been beneficial, though perhaps its not the universal panacea you like to think it is. In this particular incident, once they had departed, things would have been sticky with or without TCAS 1 as its difficult to know how best to handle a conflict in IMC especially when you are doing 80kts at low level in IMC and the threat is doing 200+kts coming from behind.
Ideally it would have stopped them taking off in the first place, but one could argue that they would have had to look at the display to get that information, when in fact there was aural information (the blind RT transmissions from Tower) that gave them the same information, and normally one would expect aural information to "get through" more easily than a display icon.
I am not saying that TCAS 1 is a waste of time - far from it - its just that its not perfect and TCAS 2 is better.
Its interesting to note how the CAA have contributed to safety in this area. First of all they blocked attempts by helicopter operators in the N Sea to fit TCAS1 citing a spurious technical argument about the effect on TCAS 2 equipped fixed wing (which are of course far more important in their eyes). I say "spurious" because they have recently backtracked on their stance and are now aligned with the rest of the world. Then there is the CAA, EASA and Eurocontrol's stance on TCAS2 - its totally unsuitable for helicopters. Something that Bristow have proven to be rubbish with their trial. Hopefully we will soon have the STC to prove it (currently held up by EASA's creeping sluggishness of their approval process aided by some sour grapes no doubt).
HC