On the TCAs issue : caution not to mix pre-Ueberlingen ( July 2002) ACAS training guidelines , with post Ueberlingen. The current ones are quite different.
At the time, the training guidelines were not that obvious : an RA was an " advisory" not a " command" to be followed with closed eyes regardless of anything else. The contradiction between an ATC clearance" against RA direction was not that clear.
Most AIPs ( including the German one that legally was in force at the time and place of the collision ) said that unless in Emergency pilots should not deviate from ATC clearances, and an RA was never defined as an emergency.
In our case the ATC instruction was BEFORE the RA. So a bit of kindness for our Russian colleagues.They did some things wrong perhaps, but so did everybody else that night. But all this is in the BFU report.
Back to the original thread :
Latest from the trial : 7 of the 8 defendants accused the late controller on duty as the only person responsible. . He turns out to be the perfect scapegoat .Even his colleague ( the one that went to bed at 2300 ) said it was all the other controller fault, as it was up to him to check what the technicians were doing and what were the consequences. The judge asked him " But why did not you ask them yourself ,as when you went off duty you saw all of them waiting to come in the OPS Room ? : his reply :" It was not my task, and even if I had asked them, I would not have been able to understand their responses , I am not a specialist "
Pathetic defense ...I do not know which lawyers are advising them, but I do not think this will impress the judges much.