OK here are two incidents.
INCIDENT 1
Crew well rested. Capt flew VIP 747 in gulf. It was an ex Lufty a/c with the overhead switches reversed.
Crew missed the aural warning CB as it was pulled by engineering the night before doing auto speedbrake function tests.
Capt set the Air Cond Press panel up in reverse after start. Bleeds Off, Packs Off. FO read checklist but didnt check visually.
Bird strike on takeoff roll.
After takeoff checks performed poorly by FO who was more interested in the bird strike and whether it had gone thru ENG.
10000 ft checks performed poorly again with the usual pope like gesture at the air cond panel but didnt know what he was looking for I suspect.
No CAB ALT warning at 10000, CB was out remember.
Master caution overhead at 14000ft. Crew observed O2 drop, but didnt believe it. Called CCM in who confirmed it.
Normal descent initiated, normal landing, although Packs and Bleeds reconfigured on short finals.
This happened 6 years before Helios' accident.
INCIDENT 2
Capt elected to fly a bleeds off takeoff for practice. Not on a training flight either.
A/C began to pressurise after takeoff thru the APU.
After flaps up, FO started to reconfigure whilst the Capt hand flew.
Capt watched the FO do the reverse C flow, bleeds ON etc, but thinking job done, didnt see FO turn OFF the PACKS.
A/C depressurised slowly and CABIN ALT warning went off as a/c climbed thru FL230.
The crew thought it was a CONFIG warning and started looking for CB to pull.
then they woke up and went down.
Both these crews were highly experienced average operators. Yes of course it doesnt look like that reading the facts. But I do know there are many many weaker operators than these 2 crews out there.
So, there you go Boeing, Helios part 2 and part 3, almost!
