chinny, I agree with your points about the hazards of ‘standard’ briefings and the incorrect implementation of SOPs. We must avoid complacency associated with standard or routine operational behaviors. I also agree with the principles of checking / questioning – if you determine the appropriate question for a situation (question yourself), then where the ‘answer’ is obvious, situation awareness, decision making, etc follow naturally.
Flexibility, a way of avoiding complacency, starts with a good briefing (the plan); this requires experience and skill – abilities that have to be acquired. There should never be a ‘standard brief’; TEM requires that the unusual (difference) is correctly identified and then related to the safety of the operation. Every flight – taxi, take off, climb, etc will be different; route, weight, speeds, weather; all or any one of these are components of the situation, and thus can provide a threat or opportunity for error. The skill in briefing is to identify the differences and relate them to the planned operation and the expected situations, i.e. create a plan against which each stage of flight can be checked at a later time. The check provides the opportunity to detect, avoid, or respond to emerging threats and errors.
Generally, SOPs are restricted to a narrow range of situations, often just one case. Thus, the identification (understanding) of the situation is a vital TEM activity (does the SOP apply here?). SOPs should not be followed blindly; they provide guidance for action based on current understandings, the generation of options, and careful judgment. Many of the perceived problems with the use of SOPs originate with their content or format; their production may not have been well thought through – well tested in foreseeable situations; thus there is a need for the working level to be involved – to provide feedback about SOPs.
GlueBall, I agree that in the situation encountered by the Helios crew, the design of the warning system was poor, but it is similar to that in many aircraft types. Yes, the system could (should) be improved, but when balanced against many occasions when it has been correctly identified, then the specific of issues applying to Helios should also be considered. Some are discussed in
Past the edge of Chaos. Not every cabin high-altitude alert requires the use of oxygen, but they all require assessment - thinking.
I disagree with your view about thinking being a dangerous waste of time.
How we should think, the processes (the types of thinking) that make up the concept of ‘thinking’, depend on the situation. Retaining control of our thinking is a vital activity (an extension of staying in control of the situation). This is the basis of mainstream theories of behavior – skill, rule, or knowledge based activity.
In critical time-limited situations, skill based behavior relies on subconscious thought. We act apparently without thinking, quickly and usually accurately. However, this is based on training and education – previous thoughts and embedded memories. This is the basis of a skill that gives humans unique abilities in well-known, well practiced situations. However, in unfamiliar situations care must be taken to avoid responding incorrectly (error) – we should switch to conscious thought (behavior - direct your attention to ...) and check that the situation is understood. Apparently, the Helios crew did not do this.
Whilst most ‘stick and throttle’ activities are ‘subconscious’ skills, there are only be a few non normal / emergency situations that require skill based thinking and action – RTO (if acting on a call), EGPWS, Windshear, and ACAS maneuvers. Most other warnings occur in situations that enable time for more considered thought (usually with reference to checklists or SOPs). Thus, it is the correct identification of the situation that drives our thinking – focus of attention, analysis, recall from memory, judgment, etc, and provides some degree of error checking – self monitoring, cross monitoring. With incorrect thinking – poor control or behavior can result in hazardous situations, but the use of the appropriate mode of thinking for the situation is never a waste of time and is the most valuable TEM resource that we have.