PS, no offence taken.
A reasonable question this time but it takes a lot of ordnance to disable even one MOB for a reasonable length of time; SLBMs are very expensive and need to be reserved for discrete, high value targets of significance - they are not suitable (if only for lack of numbers) for taking out every HAS on an airfield. And before anyone jumps in with 'runway cratering = same effect', we learned conclusively in 1991 that disabling runways is a difficult task that requires specialist weapons and even then the 'effect' is only temporary.
With hindsight, the Argentines might have been better to accept the damage inflicted by a few raids but herein lies the problem - we are analysing this with the benefit of hindsight when it is easy to draw conclusions.
At the time, the Junta had no way to be sure of what the UK intent was (i.e. what target sets we were prepared to prosecute), how sustainable such raids were or on what scale we could mount them. Returning to 'influence', it is important to understand the mind of the enemy and not make the mistake of applying our own perspective. Arguably, a totalitarian military Junta with a fundamentally weak grip on power would find it unacceptable to permit any enemy aircraft to execute a successful raid on the motherland (loss of face, demonstration of impotence, etc - issues that are often underestimated in the West), whereas a missile strike 'might' be more acceptable (less of a ‘violation’ of airspace?) and even turned to a propaganda advantage (cowardly Brits launch sneak attack, etc - witness outcry over Belgrano).
And, off course, SLBMs were not an option in 1982 anyway!
Today - I think we could mount an equivalent raid to Black Buck but I doubt it would have the same 'effect' because those lessons have been learned.
And we would lack the political will anyway...