SASless,
I'm not sure I share your view of accident investigators, the ones who I know and work with (mostly from the AAIB UK) are ex-pilots - both helicopter and fixed-wing. However I do agree with you that once all the facts are on the table a multi-discipline team, including current operational pilots, can provide additional insight into root causes of accidents.
In fact the recommendation that I posted earlier comes from the JHSAT who are a multi-discipline team re-examining accidents from the archives - starting with the year 2000 and then moving to later years. The recommendation on data recorders was produced after they examined all accidents for the year 2000, had to drop a number because of insufficient data and were frustrated on a large number of the others because of sparse data.
However, there is another interesting point in your post which I would like to pick up on - what did or did not happen in the cockpit should be only one part of what is considered. Most causal chains have links which might precede the accident by days, weeks and even months. Only when these other issues are considered are we in a position where we could address all causes.
The most effective way to reduce the number of accidents - and the aim of the IHST/JHSAT is to reduce the number by 80% within 10 years - is to attempt to break the causal chain at as many links as is possible.
We have no chance of meeting such a target unless we have a sea-change in attitudes; with up to 80% of accidents being as a result of human factors the target is impossible to achieve unless we can find a way of making all members of our community more risk aware and making our operations more error tolerant.
As you have also remarked, with the capture of operational data comes the ability to better understand the operational environment; with this understanding - and with the help of ASRS, CHIRP and in-house reporting schemes - comes the ability to address unsafe acts and latent conditions at the time when 'abnormality' or incidents first manifest themselves.
Lastly, consideration of the accidents leads one to believe that we bandy CFIT around too lightly; a large number of accidents that are seen - certainly in the lighter helicopters - are as a result of Loss of Control resulting from flight in a reduced visual cue environment. Before loss of control, and accident, occurs we are past the point where any internal instrument could prevent the event. It is unlikely that many of such accidents could be addressed without either improving the handling qualities of the helicopter or pilots being aware that flight in such conditions is likely to result in (their) death.
...and so we return to EMS.
Jim