wmdgrant,
You question about the rule-making process in the "programming" of a pilot is a subject I have thought about at some length. I am sure the issues are universal to training of humans in most fields. Let me share some thoughts with you.
There are rules to assess risks, define actions and predict outcomes that grow increasingly complex with increased operational flexibilities (ie, more environments, more types of short term operations, more types of missions). The determination of proper human conduct through training seems to have 4 levels, similar to the steps in a typical trade:
1) Novice or apprentice - have a limited set of hard fast rules, simple, direct, deterministic, describing a sub-set of the total required environment and tasks. The student and private pilot fall in here. We limit environments and tasks to capture safety ,(day, visual), and we limit exposure (fewer seats), and we reduce pressure to accomplish the task (non-commercial recreational operations with little pressure to perform).
2) Journeyman - an accomplished capable achiever. Knows more sets of rules, each set adapted to specific environments, all still deterministic. The rule sets are complex, and the journeyman knows which to use when, but may reach limits of operational capabilities in unusual corners, or when the environments become mixed, creating a minor conflict (fuzzy correlation) between competing rule sets. Low time commercial pilots or high time private pilots are journeymen.
3) Experts - have a more complex set of rules, with increasingly greater breadth of operational capability. They have determined the cross-overs between rule sets that bridge the conflicts that stifle a journeyman. Their rule sets are not separate and parallel, they tend to cross and meet in places where the journeyman is stimied. They can fly nightand instruments and with icing successfully, where the compounding of the rule sets is quite complex. They are still rule driven, and occasionally fail to perform because they chose the "wrong" rule set, usually by believing inaccurate information and failure to identify that fact in time (American Airlines Chicago, engine dropped off, aircraft was climbing successfully, the crew slowed down to Vy and lost roll control. Air Florida at DCA obeyed max EPR and failed to climb, struck 14th st bridge. Three Mile Island crew did not identify incorrect reactor pressure/temp readings and misidentified the situation). Most failures in this class of pilot are lumped into a breakdown of "situational awareness." High time commercial pilots and airline pilots are in this catagory.
4) Masters - have passed through a gate that breaks down the multiple rule sets of the expert through unification of the rules. The master pilot sees the situation as more simple than the expert, because the master's rules are reduced into fewer, simpler rules with "fudge factors" that allow the rules to apply while jumping between operational environments. Many very high time pilots with broad backgrounds have achieved master level. Test pilots are there too. The master explains decisions using standard fuzzy logic phrases such as "that depends" and "it's simple, really". If we plotted the master's rules, they would be three dimensional. The master can predict outcomes that are robust, and see through the conflicts brought about by inaccurate information, because the master can see and eliminate the inaccurate data and inconsistancies before an inaccurate answer is produced.
I would be glad to discuss this with you further, if you'd like. I am a high time experimental test pilot, and have created training programs for introduction of new equipment and new missions.
Regarding the error reporting issues of aviators, there is a general cultural conditioning that I have observed that might shed some light on the problem. In most cultures, pilots tend to be self-deprocating, and generally credit luck and chance for specific achievements. They also tend to describe screw-ups in hangar talk to help spread the word on what not to do. There is an almost opposite pilot culture to the character of "Maverick" in Top Gun, the swaggering ego, because this ego driven person will not learn from his mistakes, and will end up repeating them, disasterously. The best pilots I know are confident, and can assert themselves with the machine, but they can easily admit mistakes, tell what went wrong, and help all learn from the error. I wonder if medicine has the same culture, or do doctors tend to hold their most intimate self appraisals inside?
[ 29 November 2001: Message edited by: Nick Lappos ]
[ 29 November 2001: Message edited by: Nick Lappos ]