Interesting thread.
With regard to the way in which aerospace culture is formed and has changed, I have recently finished reading the report on Qantas aircraft that overran the runway in Bangkok, no casualties, but $100 million damage.
As was said earlier, it could have been called "Pilot Error" he selected wrong flap, and wrong reverse thrust setting, then compounded by a late decision change.
Yet true to form in the current culture and learning environment, it was found that the pilot had only ever been trained to use that much flap/thrust setting. In fact the company had almost demanded this be the norm for all approach and landings.
All pilots have been retrained and the organisation has learnt as a whole. The pilot still flies today, it was not his fault.
The report makes very interesting reading and was published by the Bureau Air Safety Investigation in September 2000.
I also highly recommend the book "Human Factors in Multi-Crew Flight Operations" by H.Orlady and L.Orlady published by Ashgate 1999.
Several chapters covering Non-punitive incident reporting, selection and training, crew resource management and other aviation psychology issues.