This same "inside of the turn" rejoin phenomenon caused an F4E crash off the Range at Evans Head, Qld and a number of crashes of Mirage III's off Saltash Bombing Range near RAAF Williamtown NSW (A3-61 & A3-77 & A3-109) and near RAAF Butterworth Malaysia (A3-32 & A3-37).
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This RAAF F4E (reg: A69-7203) aircraft was lost 16/06/71 off Evans Head, NSW with the loss of both crew. Report extract below (from
this link ):
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During the bombing phase, the No.2 aircraft in the formation suffered a suspected hang-up of one bomb so a decision
was made to return via the alternate route to base with No.2 aircraft flying as leader.
The No.2 aircraft reported off the range at 1943 hrs, heading 120 M and climbing out to 6,500 ft. As he (the lead aircraft) was passing 2,500 ft the RSO instructed the formation to maintain 1,000 ft due to conflicting traffic (Cordite formation). The instruction was acknowledged by No.2 and he commenced a descent to 1,000 ft, turning to port onto a heading of 010 M. No.1, at this stage, was in the process of rejoining his No.2 on the inside of the turn from about three miles astern.
While the leader was levelling at 1,000 feet, he entered a patch of low cloud causing the rejoining aircraft to lose visual contact. The leader then stopped his turn until he emerged from the cloud and the joining aircraft regained visual contact. The leader then resumed his port turn and rolled out on the desired heading. He then looked behind to see lights, which he thought to be the other aircraft, at his 8:30 position and very low. Almost immediately the lights disappeared.
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Leader's statement: 'The range then told me not to climb above 1,000 ft. I acknowledged and started a descent back to 1,000 ft. I also started a left turn. During the turn (30° bank) I entered cloud and No.1 called lost contact. I rolled wings' level and called my heading of 030 M. Shortly after, I broke out of cloud and he said "confirm heading 030". I replied "affirmative". He then said "contact, we're in your left eight o'clock, continue your turn".'
'I then rolled left to a heading of 010 M (only about 20° of bank was used). After No.l's call, my navigator advised me that he had the aircraft in sight and that he was moving into position.' 'Once I was steady on 010 M, I looked to the left and saw what I believe was an aircraft in my left 8.30 position, very low on me. This almost immediately disappeared...'
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Extract #2
Evaluating the evidence
During the investigation, the route flown by the formation on the night of the accident was reconstructed, using two other Phantom aircraft. The pilot of the rejoining aircraft reported the following observations.
'As No.1 commenced the descending left turn,
I attempted to match his angle of bank and remain in the same plane as his wing. To do this I had to be at a lower altitude than No.1. Although I had prior knowledge that No.1 was to descend and there was a good visual horizon on this day, there was no sensation of a descent when remaining in the same plane as No.1's wing.'
When No.1 went into the 20° left bank turn onto 0100M, I matched his angle of bank and when I noticed that he was rolling wings level, I rolled into a 30° right bank turn to effect the rejoin as I was approximately one mile from No.1 in his low 8 o'clock position.
My altimeter at this point indicated 3,000 ft. and No.1 was still at 4,000 ft.'