Hi
lefthanddownabit
As for the confusion over what incident you were talking about, I hope you can understand why I thought you meant AA587. If you can point me at the NTSB report for the incident you refer to I'd be interested to read it.
Of course I can understand your reasoning – I was trying not to be overly specific as I generally don’t like airing other people’s laundry (dirty or otherwise) if I have a choice. The accident report (what there is of it) to which I was referring is at the following link:
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?e...08X07893&key=1 However, it didn’t get the write up to match anywhere near the level of communications, interviews, on-site simulator looks, etc., that took place during the investigation. Sometimes I get very disappointed with the way
some of the activities of the Board are carried out. I hasten to add that generally they are a very fine group of folks performing a superior service for the aviation industry – its just that there are times when politics rears it’s ugly head – and one never knows from what direction it comes.
The POI does not evaluate the simulator, but has the power to withdraw approval, in this case based on a serious defect not being corrected. Also after an FAA evaluation, the POI still has to authorise the simulator's use for training, so can affect the outcome. The recurrent FAA inspection visits should also pick up on such a defect if it was written up, as it should have been, or if they encounter it themselves. In my experience, the FAA can, and often do, use their power to force operators to update or correct their simulators. However if no one reported it then you can't blame the simulator for not fixing itself.
I agree with your statement completely. However, when one does not know that the simulator is programmed incorrectly in some way, sometimes it is extremely difficult to determine that improper programming without flying the precise profile at issue. Most FAA recurrent evaluations call for about 2˝ hours of subjective flying and about 1˝ hours of objective testing. And normally, things like an evaluation of a particular simulator’s ability to adequately train recovery from unusual attitudes, will be accomplished only if the airplane and simulator manufacturer agree with the programming involved.
However, to the point at issue, as I said earlier if the FAA POI had sat in the simulator and observed one of the profiles that used this particular scenario, it is my opinion that he (or she?) would have thought the exercise had considerable merit. And, importantly, if a pilot were actually flying the simulator (aside from the ridiculous ramping away of control and then ramping back in that control effectiveness later on – I still believe that is negative training!), particularly if he (or she) was flying it the way the briefing told them to fly, that pilot would probably NOT have noticed the tendency of the simulator to achieve the “magic” pitch-bank limit and stay there. This is because the pilot would have applied the down-wing rudder, on cue, to bring the nose down toward the horizon (and the computer back into a known area) and he (or she) would likely never have been aware of what had just happened.
I do not know if this particular circumstance was ever “written up” in the simulator log. Had it been, I’m quite sure the FAA Simulator evaluators would have checked – and, to my knowledge, the FAA never conducted such an evaluation. So, I guess we all can take that for what it’s worth.