Hey there
lefthanddownabit
For example, a major US airline had an older version of the A300-600 / A310 simulator (and now I don’t remember which cockpit was actually replicated) in which a pitch-up and bank angle combination beyond a certain point would simply “hang” the simulator at that pitch/bank attitude with no control input from the pilots.
If this were really true I'd be amazed the airline's FAA POI allowed them to continue to use the sim without correcting the problem, which I have never seen the like of in thirty years in flight simulation.
Your level of amazement does not surpass my own. However, now you can legitimately say you’ve seen something for the first time in “30 years in flight simulation.” FAA POIs aren’t necessarily responsible for evaluating every aspect of a particular simulator’s programming. And, besides, if someone were sitting in the observer’s seat of a simulator and watch someone “fly” it as I described, and the pilots used the techniques I’ve described, my impression would be that the observer would probably think the exercise had considerable merit. In fact, if YOU were the pilot in that simulator, unless you actually let go of the controls at the appropriate time (to recognize the simulated airplane didn’t react as you would have expected) I think it quite likely that you, also, may have thought the exercise had at least some merit.
In fact, what you are refering to is a training scenario for unusual attitudes, not a defect due to problems in a look up table. The sim is driven to the preset unusual attitude selected by the instructor. While going to the attitude pilot inputs are ignored. The pilot controls are then unfrozen and they are expected to recover using the methods they have been trained in. Apparently the simulator in question needed some rudder during recovery, which may have lead the F/O to use rudder primarily.
Actually, in fact, I am referring to a training simulator that was used for training the recovery from unusual attitudes. Two things about that:
First, we are describing two separate simulator scenarios. There is, or rather I believe it now should be described as “was,” a series of upset recoveries that, as explained to me, contained an external disturbance (e.g., wake turbulence, atmospheric, etc.) being introduced, causing the simulated airplane to respond accordingly. The flight control inputs from the pilot stations were “ramped down” (but not frozen) according to a pre-programmed rate and then “ramped back in” when the aircraft reached a predetermined minimum value of pitch, bank, and/or yaw. I know, for a fact, that this “control issue” (the ramping down and up) was not widely known outside of the airline simulation and/or training departments – and probably not known very widely
within those same departments. And there are several training organizations (including airlines) who use that same “technique,” for the same purpose – and, if I’m reading you correctly – one that you do not agree with. If I’m right in my assumption, I am fully, 100%, in agreement with you. I believe that is irresponsible training – leading to a gross misunderstanding of aircraft response to pilot input. I am hoping that these other organizations will recognize the problems this causes and remove that idiocy from their programs – if it still exists.
Second, the simulator to which I am referring was not programmed the way I described above. In this particular machine, the pilot could fly it into the pitch/bank area that ran the computer into an “unknown” zone – and it simply “maintained” what it had until something else happened. Once flying the simulator to that position – you could get out and go to lunch – to return an hour later and find the simulator still in the pitch/bank attitude – waiting for something to happen. What that was, required one of the pilots to use some of the flight controls that were not in an “unknown zone” – like the rudder. Using a small amount of down-wing rudder to move the nose of the simulated airplane more to the horizon, apparently moved the computer back into an area where it found viable information and the simulated airplane regained its responsiveness to pilot input. For quite a while there was an on-going argument about the viability of using rudder input to “help” the airplane recover from a nose high attitude. The pros and cons varied all over the place – but the basic premise was that pilots should not be taught to NOT use flight control inputs, particularly when they were small and coordinated. Unfortunately, the part about not repeating that input and not repeatedly reversing those inputs was not discussed – at this airline, nor any other training organization or airline – to my direct knowledge until after the frightful accident in New York.
Whether or not unusual attitude training is completely valid in an FFS is arguable, but if properly constructed it can be useful.
Generally, I agree with you here. Although, I believe the use of a simulator for training upset recoveries is useful only as long as we stay away from the procedures to be used. As we’ve said here, outside of the flight test validated envelope the performance of the simulator cannot be trusted to be anything like the performance and handling of the airplane in the same situations. However, for someone who has never been in such an attitude (whatever that attitude may be) the ability to see and recognize the relationship of the altimeter, airspeed, ADI, etc. movements in comparison to the “outside view” can be tremendously valuable. Things like, What is the shortest distance to roll to get to the horizon? What is “g-loading?” How many “g’s” can you expect to generate with rather modest movements of the controls (via reference to control force) when in such situations? And so on. Where I think we get into trouble is when we try to “teach” a pilot what to do to recover his/her airplane from such situations.
There is no mention in the NTSB report of the simulator itself being suspected as a cause, only the airline's training program which emphasised rudder use at high AOA.
First, the reference I made was not referring to the American 587 accident out of New York.
Second, the incident I AM referring to
was looked into by the NTSB and there
were questions about the simulator’s programming. There also were questions from the NTSB when they were investigating the AA587 accident.
Third, I don’t think that anyone could say that the training program you reference “emphasized rudder use at high AOA.” Actually, I think all the statements contained in the AA587 report reflect a training program that called for coordinated use, or minimum use, of the rudder. And, as I recall, statements were obtained from instructors and students having completed that particular course of training.
I have personally “flown” this particular simulator and it DID what I describe here.
I'm sure you have, but was there someone on the IOS who maybe decided to throw you an unusual attitude to deal with?
No, actually, there was not. I could give you the names of the persons who were with me on that simulator flight, but I’d wind up, if not actually disclosing my identity, surely limiting the area of consideration – and, with my apologies, I am not ready to do that.
Finally, I'm still puzzled by this statement of yours:
Several decades ago the simulation industry went to the aerodynamic model; and quite frankly, I think that is why X-plane has a pretty nice product.
What I meant was that a reasonably inexpensive program could be had that used a completely developed aero-program, including the medium through which the “airplane” traveled; the air – and those interested in how aircraft shape affected the aerodynamics could plug those shape changes into the program and see the results. I fully recognize that the Austin Meyer link provided a biased point of view – but that hardly makes what he says less truthful.