Alf5071h -
There appears to be similarities with the accidents in Bangkok (747) and Burbank (737). In these events, the situational cues for the safest course of action appeared to be obvious (with hindsight), but for some inexplicable reason the pilot did not perceive them or they did not trigger the required action
I agree with the way your describing this – there are numerous examples of similar situations. Not sure if I’d include Qantas at Bangkok though, if we might consider some ‘mitigation’ of pilot action: poor weather; vis deteriorating considerably just before touchdown; failed/flawed policy of flap 25 with idle reverse being considered the norm; baulked comms leading the crew to believe (reasonably) aircraft ahead had touched-down safely. Another factor was the much smaller time scale from when things were ‘out of the box’ and the time available for correct decision making. Burbank, though, is a pretty good match.
“In these events, the situational cues for the safest course of action appeared to be obvious (with hindsight)” Well – I try to remember myself that we are looking on with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight – but in this case, as in a few others, I think we know enough know to maybe lower the hindsight guard. However, you are correct, there is a fundamental weakness. I know of another incident (with luck only aircraft damage) which mirrors GA200 in almost every way. An approach being conducted when it should obviously have been abandoned, F/O calling for GA (both before AND after touchdown in my example), F/O not forcing the issue or taking control, captain ignoring calls.
Have there been any successful ‘FO’ takeovers in erroneous situations (ignoring incapacitation)?
Well from low vis monitored approaches – it would be the norm for those operators who practice it.
If we extend your idea about F/O taking over along the lines of ‘low vis monitored procedures’ being the norm. That is to suggest on every approach – the same philosophy as applies in low vis conditions: that the monitoring pilot should consider things as an ‘approach to mins’ – then automatic go-around at mins by him, if out of the box – unless the contrary is the case ; everything ok to ‘allow’ the PF to proceed to landing. If I’m not way off the mark – I’d go along with the logic behind that. But then – it still comes down to a system which is dependent on training and discipline, and we still have a problem if the F/O is inexperienced or lacks assertiveness.
As far as your suggestion about reversing the primary roles (if I might refer to it in those terms), again I see the logic there. But I think, it still leaves us as slaves to some of the same potential problems. In addition to monitoring aircraft performance, how the approach is proceeding – an additional stress on the commander would be monitoring(or ‘dealing-with’) an in-experienced F/O’s airmanship/flying technique. With regards to how F/O’s with little experience fit into the equation in this – were into a ‘chicken and egg’ situation. With the best training, CRM, organisational involvement, etc – there’s still only one way to gain experience!
by changing the process of monitoring to use the most experienced pilot as the monitor, this also enables FOs to gain experience quickly
True – but for some airlines there is already a policy of ‘restricting’ their f/o’s abilities/oportunities to gain experience. So you’d probably have a battle with organisational culture in a few places.
his interjections were probably started too late, ultimately too late to takeover even if he could have
mmm- well he could have at any stage right down to the tarmac – possibly for a short time after too (there could have been no doubt in their minds, even at that stage, that it was a baulked landing).
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PK-KAR,
It’s ok, it was the full version I saw. Can’t remember the exact timings, but the on-field response didn’t seem unreasonable. I agree about the notion of a reasonably ‘forseeable concept’ being behind regulatory requirements – but extending it cover all eventualities is a little stupid. As for GA200, the criticism seems misplaced – obviously the NTSC think differently and don’t agree with you or I.
blaming the crash on those deficiencies is like accepting Lion's PR manager saying the MD80 crash in Solo was blamed on the concrete bound Localizer antennae being hit by the aircraft nose up at >80kts! It's just silly
I didn’t hear that one before – bit like adamair’s statements along the lines of routine maintenance on the ‘white banana’. I’ve seen quite a few ‘contributory factors’ listed in various reports worldwide which seem to be bordering on the irrelevant – at least in relation to the specifics of the particular accident. I guess in a general sense – for the most part, investigators have to include all the facts, even if only remote possibilities for completeness (sometimes to avoid criticism). Given about 100kts off the tarmac, I’d personally rate this one as necessarily included (as a ‘technical breach’ perhaps)– but pushing the ‘reasonableness’ factor as to causal effect.
Having the police trying to catch you for negligent manslaughter at the first opportunity isn't a way to get the pilot to talk!
Being anxious to take statements quickly is one thing – holding in custody for days (including the F/A’s!!!) is another.