Theamrad,
The Ch7 Vid coverage, the one that wasn't edited for the newsfeed (careful, there are 2 versions circulating), does show the equipment reaching the end of the fence... but couldn't get any further. As a local who's familiar with how the public obstructs emergency vehicles, I'd say it was pretty fortunate that a local fire engine was able to reach the site within 5-10 mins and start spraying. The criticism on the firetrucks were not one of MarkF, but, disappointingly, from the NTSC.
JOG:
RESCUE AND FIRE FIGHTING
AD CATEGORY FOR FIRE FIGHTING………….. CATEGORY VII
RESCUE EQUIPMENT…………………………….. 1 ROSENBAUER TYPE-1 9000 L
1 ROSENBAUER TYPE-2 4000 L
1 MORITA TYPE-2 4000 L
1 RESCUE MULTI PURPOSE CAR
1 AMBULANCE
CAPABILITY FOR REMOVAL OF
DISABLED ACFT…............................................... NIL
REMARK…………………………………………….. NIL
The NTSC criticized the strength of the foam trucks... but I wonder, what is the required foam spray distance? I have my doubts that a lot of the criticism of the airport was based on the concept of the actual certification requirements and the "foreseeable" concept, but rather on a hindsight basis.
On the issue of stopway and runway end safety area, I agree that this is a HUGE distraction for everyone. Annex 14 recommends/requires 240m + 60m stopway at each end of the runway. But the number of airports that violate or is deficient in this in the world is also huge (LCY anyone?). This is why crew do not calculate landing requirements and dispatchers do not approve loads where factored distances will end up having to rely on those Annex14 requirements, but on the actual available length of runway, TODAs, ASDAs and LDAs. Personally, blaming the crash on those deficiencies is like accepting Lion's
PR manager saying the MD80 crash in Solo was blamed on the concrete bound Localizer antennae being hit by the aircraft nose up at >80kts! It's just silly. In the case of GA200, the aircraft left the threshold of 27 at 100kts, and flung itself across the road at around 80kts. In my opinion, a fully compliant RESA in this case do not guarantee a write off or a break up or a fire will be prevented! The lack of clearway at the end is not a cause or a major factor in the accident, it is no more than a contributory factor to the deaths, and is not a cause.
Stopways and clearways should not be regarded for "out of the slot" or "unrecoverable" landings with the exceptions of "when there's no other choices"... which is not the case in this landing.
Theamrad, use the above numbers for your guesstimates! Bear in mind reversers were stowed 5 secs before the FDR data ended and a small positive throttle was applied somehow after that.
On the SMH/The Age article, despite its inherent errors and inaccuracies, it is still better than some other I've read on this accident. Driving away or shoowing away journalists for the history of inaccurate reporting isn't the solution. Professionals, enthusiasts and journos working together can and DO redress a heck of a lot of the series of inaccurate reporting baggage!
The ‘down*******’ issue and it’s origins have been discussed, clarified, etc, etc, ad nauseum. I have total sympathy for /agreement with PK-KARs feelings on the matter.
AAAARRRGHHH! Someone get me some valium!
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alf5071h,
I wonder if the investigation will ever be able to determine why the Captain failed to discontinue the approach; unless of course, with hindsight, he is able to provide a plausible explanation – enabling us to have an understanding of the event.
Having the police trying to catch you for negligent manslaughter at the first opportunity isn't a way to get the pilot to talk!
Failed decision making or is this ‘partial incapacitation’?
It's a bloody thin line!
What could the F/O have done? A lot, but then, one needs to see also why he ended up not taking over. Fear due to low experience can affect someone greatly and in the wrong way. You I presume is aware of the factors affecting that.
There can be many recommendations to come out of this, but a lot of those recommendations may or may not be implemented. Re-emphasizing the need to see wind conditions through the various altitudes the aircraft will go through is one, but routine and boredom will quickly erode that away. How many short haul pilots will just go and look at the dispatch papers, look at distance, origin airport, origin wx, destination airport, destination wx, alternate airport and wx, and then look at the loadings, then sign off and walk off to the aircraft? A lot. Slap an out of ordinary tailwind on a straight in from the descent and things can get out of hand quickly.
I had a heated exchange of words with some crew a few weeks before the case in JOG regarding responsibilities of planning ahead, rather than just use the excuse of "not enough time when something comes up..." (and coincidentally, the situation surrounding JOG was taken as an example) This would disagree with your alternative of "experienced F/Os or new technologies", because, people's memory do tend to be selective and fade... so stuff from training do selectively get forgotten. Supportive Captains like to fly with fresh F/Os, whose memories are still fresh from the oven, but there are those who prefer experience on the right hand seat too. The key in the matter is, it is not and should not be an exclusive club based on experience, in the very end, the relationship between left hand and right hand seats is similar to the "master and his apprentice"... A good master will encourage his apprentice to develop. Despite CRM, and the erosion of the historic stereotype of authoritarian captains and subservient F/Os, there is still one last barrier that is yet to be totally overrun, that is, the reservations of the left hand seat and the still darwinian rule of the right hand seat with regards of transfer of knowledge and experience.
GA200 seems to be a case of the good master and his scared apprentice... even a good master can make a mistake, if the apprentice is too scared, enough said.
Apologies if "master and the apprentice" isn't appropriate, but if someone can find me a better term for it I'd appreciate it...
PK-KAR