Folks,
As I recall, of all the N/VH/P2/VP/G registered B707 I flew, only the G- had a stick nudger, they all had a stick shaker.
For anybody who actually did a full Flap 50 stall in air, the violence of the pre-stall buffet, well before the stall break, leads me to wonder how anybody but the comatose could not recognise what was happening.
The B707, 120, 300 and 320, did have a very slight nose up pitch at Flap 50 only, before the nose went down. In training, most pilots didn't notice, such was the pre-stall buffeting. Simulators of the day did not nearly simulate the buffeting of the "real thing".
Hence, in early days, BOAC -436 limited to Flap 40 landings, great for tyre and brake salesmen.
In retrospect (Danair at Lusaka) I wonder how much cumulative damage we all did to the horizontal stab, or the whole tail section, with all the post maintenance and training stalls. And we have not forgotten what turbulent airflow from speed-brake did to the said posterior of a B707.
The 100/200 B747 was even worse buffeting in the stall at Flap 25 and 30.
Some may recall that the FAA FAR 25, (ex-SFAR 422B) had a different approach to low speed handling compared to our former ARB Chief Test Pilot and well known author.
As was proved the hard way, demonstrating "Tiger Moth" 1G stalls in a Trident was not a life enhancing exercise.
The B727 was never certified on 1G stall, but on "demonstrated minimum controllable airspeed", and as I recall, this held until the B767-200.
B767-300 and the B747-400 were certificated on low speed figures based on V Cl/Max, and the V Ref (25/30) for approach is 1.2 V Cl/Max, not 1.3 Vs, as about 99% of pilots assume.
It was with the Concorde that ARB/CAA had to re-think finally, ain't no such animal as a 1G stall in a delta.
In that well known tomb, Mishandling the Big Jets, D.P was finally forced to admit that early B747 were really quite nice handling aeroplanes, and Boeing did actually know something about building big aeroplanes, but he was, in my opinion, rather naughty is virtually recommending departure from Boeing recommended non-normal procedures for double engine failures.
In some (many?) quarters it is heresy and blasphemy to question DP, but on the basis of rather a lot of "close up and personal" experience in the area and era, (including some ARB approvals) I will, so there you go.
Tootle pip!!