Alf5071h – I think you may have misunderstood my reference to “their perceptions” – I apologise if it was a bit cryptic. What I meant was a reference to your remarks about factors involving loss of face etc. Just the point that public perceptions should be the last consideration when a GA is appropriate – of course passenger comfort is another ideal – but safety is paramount.
Since you’ve mentioned cultural issues – my thinking is always going to be down the line of training in best CRM practice – and the insistence on its use. From the example given by Centaurus above – what is the point of having someone in the right-hand seat who just blurts out “500 AGL – stabilised”, regardless of what is actually happening? Whether that F/O is well trained or not - he's contributing nothing to the overall safety picture.
An alternative solution is to put the functional excellence of P2 – the crosscheck/monitor and alerting functions, into a box. Humans tend to respect a computed output more than another human, particularly where the commuter provides a solution to the error. However, even this has human problems as seen with crews ignoring GPWS and more recently EGPWS.
I’m not quite sure if I’d agree with you on this point. Aside from blatantly ignoring cautions or warnings – if we look at the philosophy behind the design of EGPWS – to eliminate the generation of false alerts to the degree which is reasonable, while still providing an excellent system – we can still get a lot of those false alerts. And every false warning degrades the system (system in terms of human-machine interaction). This is also mirrored in the number of ‘false/spurious’ TCAS RA events in European RVSM in recent years – one of which triggered a ‘genuine’ conflict and secondary RA with a third aircraft. So automation doesn’t really offer a solution on its own.
Another knockdown in terms of using automation to deal with problems comes from the potential reliability of systems. We only have to look at regulations governing instrument landing systems (both ground and aircraft based) to see the consequences of system failure rates – and the limitations in use which arise from those rates (failure ‘unlikely’, ‘extremely unlikely’, etc). The additional effects which result when we consider whether a system is fail passive or fail active. Etc, etc.
‘P1 not receptive, P2 not assertive’ – well although I would have to admit it’s a lot more likely as a cultural factor in Indonesia – I agree that nowhere is completely immune from it, particularly the P1 not receptive (for example RA at Cork).
So what is the difference – Burbank, Toronto, Midway, – the number of fatalities !!
Well.... if this turns out to be the way it's shaping up to be. In the case of an overrun - the final outcome is down to luck - exactly what is at the end of the runway. If GA200 had touched down at Jakarta - the consequences may have been nose gear and engine damage, with injuries only. Similarly, if that garage forecourt at Burbank had been nice solid concrete office building....... . Reminds me of the Virgin train spill recently: one fatality, a good few injuries, a few carraiges derailed - but looking pretty good considering. But then it didn't happen in a built-up area - there were no buildings to collide with!!!