Some interesting comments in amongst that post but I'm not sure what the point of this thread is overall other than describing this accident.
BTW, Are these all your own words, Centaurus?
Which brings me to the point of this post. Often once the cockpit door is closed, there is a tendency for the two pilots to forget that the cabin crew and passengers are a captive audience to whatever dangers the captain takes them into. In the A340 accident at any stage of the approach the captain could have taken over control from the F/O and either handled the approach and landing himself - or gone around - or diverted well before the aircraft was on final in the thunderstorm.
Really not sure what the point of this post is but you're right, there is a tendency to forget the passengers during the flight but this is not an absolute.
No captain is doing his passengers any favours if, in a non-normal, all he's thinking about is all the burden of responsibility he feels on his shoulders for all the boguns in his airplane who suddenly wish they'd paid attention to the safety demo. He should be concentrating on getting his arse onto the ground safely; if he succeeds in this, the passengers will safely follow just as certainly.
Perhaps if the pilots with hindsight could have seen and heard the screams of the passengers as the aircraft went off the end, they would have never continued the approach
How is this possible, using "hindsight"?? And do you really think the visualisation of screaming, hysterical passengers should be a part of the decision process??
It is all too easy to sit in splended isolation up front - after all it is up to the cabin crew to deal with problems with passengers.
As the TV documentary pointed out, the captain was aware of the commercial cost of a diversion and there is little doubt this weighed heavily on his mind.
Not sure what you were smoking when you wrote all this... What does it mean? Why does that second comment follow the first? Ever heard of the term non-sequitur?
The trick is to know when a decision to approach in bad weather is not being subconsciously influenced by commercial pressures.
That's one of the many, many tricks, yes. But for every incident or accident like the above, there are thousands or tens of thousands of safe and timely decisions being made during the approach and landing phases of flight. Despite this, it is inevitable that an accident scenario will take place from time to time.
It matters not whether the F/O is highly experienced. There is a point where certain conditions dictate that the captain assume handling responsibility and he must not allow his perceived respect for his F/O's experience and demonstrated skills to abrogate that command responsibility.
Thank you for that. So the intent of this thread is to be a lecture? I think I get it now!!
Often the captain will find himself rationalising that the F/O can do the job just as well as the captain and disregards his conscience. Maybe the F/O can do the job as well as his captain - but that's not the point here.
I like that. I'm going to take that concept on board as a worthwhile notion to keep in mind, at times. I've noticed it happening occasionally but never put it into words.
When weather conditions are such that the captain begins to feel that perhaps he should be running the show rather than "monitoring" the F/O's decision making and handling - then that it is the time to take decisive action and DO something.
PPRuNe Command School...
It is too late when the aircraft is high and fast over the fence and the captain does not know if the F/O is going to flare high in heavy rain or float down the runway.
No, it's not. It's too late when reverse thrust has been selected on the ground. Before that a go-around is still an option.
How can the captain possibly know if the F/O is going to be far too slow to pull reverse thrust - or to kick off the drift in a strong crosswind on a wet runway.
It's called faith. As a member of a crew, each of us has to have faith that the other member or members will carry out the required functions as per training. This applies whether the other crew-member is known personally or a complete stranger.
Another option to the faith the company expects you to have in a stranger whom they have certified to do the job, is to lob into the sim with every new crew-member you are rostered to fly with and evaluate him, before you operate the sector. Do you think this will work?
A third option is to curl up into the foetal position and, rocking gently to and fro, cry yourself to sleep in fear.
Let's get real. If your FO's been checked to line, why should you harbour doubts (without previous cause) about his abilities?
You are right in that in many airlines, the captain is expected to act as PF when conditions exceed certain parameters. But this is because he is assumed to be the best suited, not because FOs are generally held in suspicion.