Your landing or mine - the captain's ultimate responsibility
Interesting Channel Seven TV documentary on the Air France A340 overrun at Toronto last year. All aboard (311) escaped with minor injuries. It was compelling viewing especially when compared with the official accident report.
The A340 landed in heavy rain and thunderstorm activity. The captain gave the F/O the landing despite reports of really severe conditions. After coming over the fence at 100ft with a 33 knot crosswind and a quarter inch of water on the runway, the F/O floated 4300ft in to the 9000 ft runway before touch down. To compound the problem reverse thrust was not selected until 13 seconds after touch down. It seems the F/O might have frozen on the reverse levers. The aircraft left the runway at 70 knots and caught fire after nosing into a ravine. The documentary revealed the captain urging the F/O to "get it down, get it down" during the float.
Passengers still tried to carry hand baggage with them down the escape slides and one frame showed a man with a large bag blocking the escape slide flow. I found it compelling watching when a few of the survivors were interviewed for the programme some months after the accident and it made one realise the real responsibility of the captain for the safe conduct of the flight. The people down the back were absolutely terrified as flames erupted after the A340 went into the ravine and the survivors that were interviewed still carried horrible memories of the crash sequence.
Which brings me to the point of this post. Often once the cockpit door is closed, there is a tendency for the two pilots to forget that the cabin crew and passengers are a captive audience to whatever dangers the captain takes them into. In the A340 accident at any stage of the approach the captain could have taken over control from the F/O and either handled the approach and landing himself - or gone around - or diverted well before the aircraft was on final in the thunderstorm. Perhaps if the pilots with hindsight could have seen and heard the screams of the passengers as the aircraft went off the end, they would have never continued the approach
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It is all too easy to sit in splended isolation up front - after all it is up to the cabin crew to deal with problems with passengers. As the TV documentary pointed out, the captain was aware of the commercial cost of a diversion and there is little doubt this weighed heavily on his mind. The trick is to know when a decision to approach in bad weather is not being subconsciously influenced by commercial pressures. The example of the British Airways Boeing 747 captain to continue 10 hours to London on three engines after losing an engine in the early climb from New York (?) is a case in point. The FAA certainly thought it was a bad decision but BA didn't.
In the documentary on the Air France A340 accident, the captain offered the F/O either the take off or the landing. There was no indication then of possible bad weather at the other end. The F/O then told the captain that he (the captain) could do the take off while he (the F/O) would do the landing at Toronto. The problem arises when the captain starts to have nagging doubts about the wisdom or otherwise of his subordinate doing the handling when weather conditions turn really nasty. It matters not whether the F/O is highly experienced. There is a point where certain conditions dictate that the captain assume handling responsibility and he must not allow his perceived respect for his F/O's experience and demonstrated skills to abrogate that command responsibility.
The decision becomes clouded when a mateship culture pervades on the flight deck as it does in some airlines. The captain feels slightly embarrassed that he is harbouring doubts about who should be doing the flying. Often the captain will find himself rationalising that the F/O can do the job just as well as the captain and disregards his conscience. Maybe the F/O can do the job as well as his captain - but that's not the point here. When weather conditions are such that the captain begins to feel that perhaps he should be running the show rather than "monitoring" the F/O's decision making and handling - then that it is the time to take decisive action and DO something.
It is too late when the aircraft is high and fast over the fence and the captain does not know if the F/O is going to flare high in heavy rain or float down the runway. How can the captain possibly know if the F/O is going to be far too slow to pull reverse thrust - or to kick off the drift in a strong crosswind on a wet runway.
Of course the F/O may harbour the same feelings when the captain is handling in bad conditions. But the command responsibility is with the captain and the passengers are expecting this God among men to fly them safely. The captain should remember that he is doing his F/O no favours by putting him in the position of vital decision making that could go either way in bad weather. Leave those risks to the simulator during ccommand training. The flight deck is not a democracy and the captain should not feel a wimp if he decides to take over control. Equally the F/O should put himself in the captain's position and realise that it is not necessarily a reflection on his decision making or handling skills if the captain changes his mind and decides to do the handling himself.
The TV documentary on the A340 crash at Toronto provides a powerful flight safety message and every crew member should try and view it.
Last edited by Centaurus; 29th Mar 2007 at 14:11.