Read the paragraphs near the end I put in red..........
The FAA released an Airworthiness Bulletin Today:
here
NTSB Identification: NYC07MA073
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Accident occurred Thursday, March 08, 2007 in Princeville, HI
Aircraft: Aerospatiale AS350BA, registration: N354NT
Injuries: 4 Fatal, 3 Serious.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On March 8, 2007, at 1502 Hawaii standard time, an Aerospatiale AS350BA helicopter, N354NT, operated by Heli-USA Airways, Inc., was substantially damaged when it collided with terrain following a loss of control while landing at the Princeville Airport (HI01), Princeville, Hawaii. The certificated airline transport pilot and three passengers were fatally injured, and three passengers were seriously injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the local air tour flight that departed the Princeville Airport about 1415, and was conducted under 14 CFR Part 135.
According to the company dispatcher, the helicopter departed for a 45-minute sightseeing flight. When the pilot contacted the company base by radio about 1455, the dispatcher anticipated a routine radio call announcing his return. Instead, the pilot announced, "I'm having hydraulic problems, and I'm probably going to have to do a run-on landing." The dispatcher took her hand-held radio, ran to the hangar area, and notified the base operator and the maintenance supervisor of the pilot's intentions. She stated that as the conversation with the pilot continued, the language he used to describe his situation changed from "hydraulic problem" to "hydraulic failure." She continued to monitor the frequency as the helicopter neared the airport. As the helicopter approached the ground, she heard the pilot state, "Okay we're done." Then, the sound of the rotor changed pitch and the helicopter impacted the ground.
In interviews, several employees of the company explained how they prepared for the helicopter's arrival and heardit approaching. Some of the employees saw the helicopter "low" over the approach end of the runway, as they stood at base operations near the departure end. The helicopter then disappeared from their view, and shortly thereafter, they heard the sounds of impact.
Another witness, who worked at the terminal building at the center of the airport and had an unobstructed view of the helicopter through her office window, watched the helicopter approach. She noticed that the helicopter was not approaching the runway faster than usual, but it was flying lower than usual. The helicopter slowed over the runway at less than 10 feet above the ground, then turned slowly towards the grassy area on the left side of the runway. The witness wondered what the helicopter was doing, because the helicopter was moving slowly in a level attitude seeming as though it would land in the grass. Then, "...all of a sudden, the nose went down and [the helicopter] hit the ground." She described the entire series of events as happening "slowly." When asked about the landing gear floats, the witness stated that they were not deployed prior to the accident.
The accident occurred during the hours of daylight approximately 22 degrees, 12 minutes north latitude, and 159 degrees, 26 minutes west longitude.
The pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate with a rating for rotorcraft-helicopter, and a flight instructor certificate with a rating for rotorcraft-helicopter. The pilot had accrued 10,471 total hours of flight experience, with 3,500 hours in make and model. His most recent Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) second-class medical certificate was issued in January, 2007.
The pilot's most recent Airman Competency/Proficiency Check was successfully completed on February 25, 2007. The pilot was also a company check airman per Special Federal Aviation Regulation 71, "Special Operating Rules for Air Tour Operations in the State of Hawaii."
The helicopter was manufactured in 1979, and had accrued 21,700 total hours of operation. The most recent 100-hour inspection was completed on February 22, 2007, at 21,642 hours. An engine change was performed on February 28, 2007, at 21,665 aircraft hours.
At 1453, the weather reported at the Lihue International Airport, Lihue, Hawaii, 16 miles southeast, included scattered clouds at 5,500 feet, and winds from 050 degrees at 13 knots. The temperature was 75 degrees Fahrenheit, and the dew point was 54 degrees Fahrenheit.
The helicopter was examined at the site on March 10, 2007, and all major components were accounted for at the scene. The helicopter came to rest on its landing gear with the landing gear floats deployed, and fully inflated. The helicopter came to rest on the sod on the left side of runway 05, 1,657 feet beyond the approach end of the runway, and 105 feet left of centerline. A ground scar marked the start of the wreckage path 1,433 feet beyond the departure end of the runway, and 72 feet left of centerline. The wreckage path was 33 feet long, oriented about 348 degrees magnetic, and ended at the final resting site of the helicopter wreckage.
The helicopter came to rest facing 168 degrees magnetic, nearly opposite the direction of travel of its approach to the airport. The nose, instrument panel, cockpit, and the cabin area forward of the rear seats were destroyed by impact, and fragments of composite materials were scattered in a wide arc around the wreckage. The center section of the fuselage was largely intact, with the main transmission and engine were in their respective locations.
The tailboom was partially attached to the fuselage via sheet metal, wires, and control cables. The remainder of the tailboom, the horizontal stabilizers, and the upper section of the vertical fin were intact. The lower section of the vertical fin and the tailskid were bent and wrinkled. Tail rotor control and drive train continuity were confirmed from where the tailboom partially separated from the fuselage back to the tail rotor. The tail rotor, tail rotor controls, tail rotor driveshaft, and tail rotor gearbox were all intact. The skin on the tail rotor paddles displayed rotational scoring near their tips.
Examination of the engine and transmission areas revealed no evidence of a preimpact fire, structural failure, fuel leak or oil leak. The engine mounts were slightly twisted, but the engine and main transmission remained in their mounts and connected by the main driveshaft. The main rotor drive shaft was ruptured approximately 3 inches from the power off-take of the transmission shaft. Both ends of the rupture exhibited torsion load deformation.
Examination of the engine revealed that the axial compressor wheel rotated freely, the wheel and blades were intact, and there were no signs of blade rub or rotational scarring. The power turbine wheel rotated freely, the power turbine wheel and blades were intact, and there were no signs of blade rub or rotational scarring. The short shaft was found separated from the reduction gearbox and exhibited signs of rotational scarring. The flexible coupling and triangular flange exhibited torsion load deformation.
The red, yellow and blue main rotor blades remained attached to the hub. The main rotor blade spars were bent and twisted, but complete to the tips. The core and skin material outboard of the first one-third of each blade was fractured and scattered around. The blue sleeve and star arm were fractured. The red star arm was fractured, but the sleeve remained attached. The yellow sleeve and star arm were intact. All three main rotor pitch change links remained attached, with the red link slightly bent.
Control continuity could not be established from the cockpit aft to the mixing unit due to impact damage and crush deformation of the airframe. Control continuity was established from the mixing unit to the flight control servos. The swashplate, scissors, and sleeve assemblies were all intact.
The hydraulic reservoir was full, but the sight glass was fractured and seeping. The hydraulic pump was intact, with the drivebelt attached. The lateral and fore and aft servos, and their respective accumulators and electro-valves were intact. The flight control servos were all attached at the non-rotating swashplate. The fore-and-aft servo, and the right lateral servo were attached to the transmission.
Further examination revealed that the lower clevis of the left lateral servo was still attached to the transmission case, but was no longer attached to the servo. Closer examination revealed that the threads on the clevis, as well as the threads on the inner diameter of the servo, appeared undamaged. The jam nut, the lock nut, and the safety wire were still attached to the clevis threads, and free to rotate. The clevis was then removed from the transmission case, and forwarded, along with its associated servo, for further examination.
The hydraulic pump and drive assembly were removed as a unit. The pump, the lateral and fore and aft servos, their respective accumulators and electro-valves, the hydraulic distribution manifold, the tail rotor servo, as well as the hydraulic pump drive belt were all removed and forwarded to the Safety Board Materials Laboratory in Washington, D.C. for further examination.