PK-KAR, while perceptions have been mentioned a few times already – it is of course fair to say that sometimes perceptions (pilot or otherwise) can be larger than reality. A problem with flap asymmetry or failure to drive past a certain position should arguably not be a ‘critical’ event in itself. I would suggest the same would be true of a ‘downdraught’ encounter at 1,000’ AGL (if not a fully-fledged microburst!). But then IF one occurred after the other – an already heightened stress level could hit the overload level, and radically alter the ability to make the ‘right’ decision. I say that not as a criticism of this crew – but more as a remark on our sometimes frail human nature. ‘Human factors’ experts tell us that we are more likely to stick to a decision we have made, even after the information on which that decision has altered significantly, then reappraise the situation and alter our initial decision. Of course, accident reports and human performance of pilot action is done in the “cold light of day” through 20/20 hindsight goggles. I think there are a good few examples where pilots were criticised for their actions – with the benefit of hindsight….when the more reasonable would admit they would do the same thing under those circumstances…….There, but for the grace of God, go I!! etc.
Whatever the leadup here – like I said before, luck can play a major roll. Nice long stopway or nice level field of grass versus road, depression and embankment = completely different outcome……more’s the pity.
If I try to ignore hindsight – and put myself at the pointy end of the stick - as far as that balancing act is concerned – the major unknowns in my mind would be fuel remaining (Garuda SOP’s and specifics for that route?) and hydraulic status. Diversion of 50nm for 400m extra or 250nm for 3000m runway – I think I’d be biased against. Including the terrain/traffic complications you’ve outlined - as for the other 2 choices :
– If hydraulic system failure (separate from or associated with) asymmetric flap – that would seriously influence my decision (While strict adherence to checklists (non-normal) is nice and for the most part essential – I believe, like some others, it shouldn’t override the use of ‘good judgement’)……. I don’t think I’d go for MA and extra time with control potentially a problem or with reduced authority. I’d be going for landing as soon as possible.
– If flap asymmetry alone, hydraulics ok and controllability not badly affected – I’d take the MA and extra time option. With that scenario – there’s bound to be a certain “startle” element (especially IF speed reduction/flap extension was on the late side anyway), and personally I’d be glad to take the extra time if at all possible. Obviously there would be a stern self briefing and same for F/O about t/d on the first available asphalt being supercritical.
This is what I think my personal decision process would be – but of course, I admit, I’m not under the stress of being “at the pointy end” and we are dealing in the realms of possible scenarios / speculation.
Sinbad1
If you remember last year Lufthansa 747-400 collapsed its nose gear at the gate
Just out of curiosity – you know if there’s a source for more details about that?
I Must say though its not looking too good for the pilots right now ...hope Im wrong
I have to admit it seems that way to me – but I hope I’m wrong too. Hopefully the FDR/CVR details will paint a different picture.
Silberfuchs – I agree with what’s been said just above. I think this is just an expression along the lines of natural human emotion (as has happened in other events in which pilots understandably felt guilt – even though they were in no way responsible for an accident) and not in the sense of trying to imply any ‘liability’ on the part of the crew. Maybe Captain Stephanus is a bit naïve/innocent in comparison to how some of the media can sometimes twist things.
Anyone care to comment on whether the FDR details will be released to the public? Or kept quiet while investigation is ongoing? (Genuine question – NOT snipping!)