Ultralights,
(warning: guess hazard)The 734 has something what I call "partial trim assist", dunno the real term for it... ie. if you pull the nose up, there will be some up trim to assist the elevator, and the same for "down"... However of you have that trim we see on the photo, it's one heck of a low trim.
If we may guess, the last significant yoke movement before any off runway impact was down. The yoke up is possibly (warning: guess hazard) a result of yoke displacement or cable distortion due to the ground impact.
The flap does not seem to be flap 30...
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Sinbad1,
I checked with an F/A on the 737 on why the slide wasn't deployed, she said, they need to assess the situation whether the slide would assist or hamper the evac. According to their manual (this is not from GA btw), for after impact land emergency...
1. Remain in brace pos until complete stop. Several impacts possible
2. Turn on Emergency Light (L1 position) {FA comment: This may not have been possible looking from the vid}
3. Wait for Command from Cockpit, if no word, if situation requires evac, initiate evac.
4. Shout emergency commands (edited)
5. If pax panic, shout assertive commands (edited)
6. Assess condition, feel for heat and look out window. Look for fire or obvious structural damage that could be hazardous for slide/raft deployment.
7. If exit is usable, open door.
(remainder of list is edited).
Now she commented, if you see obstacles or severe fire hazard, you do NOT inflate the slide. Now looking at
http://www2.indoflyer.net/botak/montage2.jpg there was the RIGHT wing ONTOP of the LEFT wing, I asked the F/A, if you see that, would you deploy the slide? Answer, No, if that catches fire, you're in trouble because it could give fuel to feed the fire even nearer to the door, hence blocking your last few exits. So, after seeing outside, you disarm the slide and open the door. Hence the "slide armed tape" is still hanging.
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but does raise the question of finding a longer runway.
That seems to be the case, but we have to wait for confirmation. A flap assymetry on/near final approach does not seem to be a reason to declare emergency. That is a judgement call for the PIC to continue, or divert. Given that the nearest alternative is 50NM away and runway length is 400m longer than JOG, and the nearest longer runway after that is Surabaya (40mins - 1hr under normal conditions, which diverting there with flap assymetry being a risky proposition in terms of fuel burn, giving you an even less choice of actions upon the ultimate approach), he had to make a decision, "is it possible to land in JOG with whatever I have left?"... Flap15 at MLW and max man brakes under 2200m, able... go for it. Now whether that was the right call to make, we'll let Garuda and the NTSC decide... bear in mind hindsight is always 20/20. If the "land long" was caused by a flap15 landing using a flap30 flare technique, well, that could explain a lot... but again, we have to wait and see.
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This apparently happened three times and on the third occasion the nosewheel oleo snapped off (thereafter no hydraulics, no nosewheel steering, no directional control via rudder, no reverse and MLG braking only from the brake accumulator - about five applications before it's empty).
Does this:
http://www2.indoflyer.net/botak/nosewheel.jpg
Look like the oleo snapped off? I've to see the pics of what part of the nosegear they found on the airport perimeter, but I am told that it is the wheels that had come loose, not the landing gear oleo.
Back to porpoising. Adding to these self-wrought woes is the fact that any power "adds" (or throttle manipulation) will inhibit spoiler extension and add to the overrun likelihood.
Well, airside eyewitnesses stated spoilers and reversers deployed, nosegear contacted runway with the wheels absent hence the sparks.
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Theamrad,
Well, high sink rate and downdraft report
could be a result of confusion due to severe emotional stress clouding one's memory. But, logically, chasing an ILS at 170 knots-ish comparing with 140, would yield a higher sink rate... and also give the visual impression to those on the ground that he was high and fast. For all we know, he could have been on slope... need the FDRs for that.
ATC reports wind as calm, but, seeing the video of the post evac, we can see there's a 5-10kt breeze... and some estimates up to 15kt. Colleagues from JOG did specify that wind that night was "unusual", but by the morning it was as we saw in the vid. Now given JOG, it wouldn't surprise me if the wind at 500'AGL would be a totally different story... thanks to the terrain.
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Flight conditions appeared normal until the aircraft was about 1000 feet above the Yogyakarta's runway, Captain Komar and his co-pilot told Captain Stephanus yesterday.
We need to determine whether "flight conditions normal until about 1000ft above" was the aircraft config, or the handling of the aircraft, which would be explained by (but needs a look into), the wind and the surrounding terrain, oe other the flap itself?
but I cannot see how the pilot would have been doing this, especially when the cockpit section ended up separating from the rest of the fuselage.
Pls check the beginning of the video, with a mangled cockpit.. but still attached (and eyewitnesses said it was still attached prior to the fire taking over).
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Finally got normal sleep last night...
PK-KAR