From the perspective of combat exerience as a grunt, CAS pilot and FAC/TACP Team Leader, a few questions come to mind:
- What FSCMs were in effect?
- What was the location of LCPL Hull's unit/vehicle when it was hit?
- What was the unit's position relative to AI Killboxes, FSCL, CFL, or any other permissive FSCM?
- Who directed the unit's movement to that location?
- Had that movement been coordinated with higher, adjacent, or even within their own unit?
- Why didn't the TACP, located within the ground unit FSCC/CP, know that there were friendlies in that location?
- Why were attack aircraft specifically told by the ground unit that there were no friendlies in that area?
FSCMs and target location relative to them define what coordination procedures are required. Some are more permissive than others. Another potential issue here is that definitions for these FSCMs can vary even amongst NATO Allies (STANAG 2099/QSTAG 531).
If the FSCM is poorly designed and is unidentifiable by either terrain features or electronically by equipment available to all commanders then it is less than worthless, it is dangerous.
If the FSCMs and changes to them are not disseminated to all in an accurate and timely fashion they are again worthless.
If ground units do not know where their elements are then no accurate air/ground coordination is possible. If elements are not where they are supposed to be the same is true.
I'm not implying that any of the above is fact. I'm not trying to deflect the issues regarding aircrew which have been discussed at some length here. I am trying to expand the discussion of potential lessons learned with the intent of prevention.
As in most mishaps, close examination will likely show there was more than one breakdown in discipline, judgement, procedure, and/or communication that day. All of which contributed to the chain of events which led to a tragic and avoidable conclusion.