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Old 1st Feb 2007, 07:24
  #43 (permalink)  
DOUBLE BOGEY
 
Join Date: Dec 2006
Location: UK and MALTA
Age: 61
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The way the report reads both pilots appear to have had a go in correcting what started as a pretty outrageous UP (38 degrees nose down & 38 degrees AOB) which would infer that each was flying by reference to his own independat flight instruments.

In addition the lack of any CVR evidence to suggest any other factors in play and the final report statement that the aicraft from FDR/CVR data appeared to behave in response to control inputs paints a fairy strong argument for disorientation and failure to recover fully from the UP. The question remians - WHY?

I do this thing every day and I cannot imagine how the AC was able to achieve such an extreme UP during a go-around when both pilots should be concentrating or at least alert enough for the NHP to intervene as the UP developed. I am also concerned that the initial report from AAIB does not explain how quickly the original UP developed and therefore how much time the NHP had to react.

Also I cannot imagine what took place that would lead the co-pilot to effectively "give-up" and ask for help. In my experience when the suituation is thus (ie in the simulator) the HP is so overaroused there is no brain power left to ask and the NHP intervenes naturally.

Finnally the Commanders failure to correct the UP fully in the time frame the report suggests does not feel right either.

The report does a really good job at inferring that these two experienced well trained flight crew loss control and flew into the sea. I am really struggling to accept that to be the case.

In the offshore industry, airspeed is probably the number one referenced instrument during approaches offshore due to the performance issues we operate under. During a go-around it is also watched carefully by both HP and NHP. The report provides FDR evidence of very high airspeeds throughout the UP and very high RODs. Both of these parameters whould lead to a powerful desire by both pilots to pull up the nose and yet the opposite happened in both cases.

In addition the initial approach was poorly handled by the co-pilot despite the fact that these crews are in engaged in a very high number of approaches and landings in the shuttle sector.

If I were a betting man I would look closely at the pitot-static system!!!!
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