Ok then, AirRabbit, to go back to my use of the word moot - I think you misunderstood me - I'm not saying the report is relegating that point. I'm saying that there is enough information within the report itself to call into question some of the assertions which may be made. Specifically, the FDR acquisition rate and the boards own acknowledgment that the vertical simulator(due to it's own limitations) could not replicate the full range of motion of the accident airplane. This, in my opinion, places at least some doubt on the accelerations and therefore pilot perception of accelerations felt during those simulator tests.
The vertical stabilizer separation on the accident aircraft appears to have occurred at the point where multiple maximum rudder deflections would have resulted in failure of the component
There's nothing in what I've said that would impune that statement. But we already know from the board's own tests (actually airbus's ground testing) that "test subjects" had difficulty making less than full rudder deflections when asked to do so. And also, IMO crucially, that "most" of the boards own "testees" used some rudder with aileron as their own preferred method of recovery in simulator tests. This particular point was also made during the public hearings, and not only by AA pilot sources. I think that should have been foremost in the thinking of the board when drawing their conclusions. I don't believe there was inadequate follow-up in the course of the investigation, personally I can't see a problem there. But what I'm baffled about, are some of the conclusions drawn by the board, and the order in which they were presented in the way of cause.
The only further thing I can add is my opinion of what
might have happened. Whether or not there was some adverse yaw due to wake turbulence is a matter which I or (I believe) the board cannot ascertain with absolute certainty. While many may say the use of rudder in nothing more than a wake turbulence encounter is wrong - it is a fact, established during simulator testing the most of the test subjects DID use rudder when recovering from and UPSET. I can only say that it's possible, through the slow FDR aquisition rate, that PF perceived a roll or yaw rate which was not picked up by the FDR, and which he thought warranted use of rudder as well as aileron. Whether right or wrong (and I think PROBABLY wrong) he got a whole lot more than he intended, thanks to the oversensitivity of the rudder, and ended up with a (severe) apc event. I can't say anymore about the failure to recognise this situation and unload the controls - but then that's a matter that's been discussed many times in other places.
DozyWannabe;
One of the things that has concerned me is the way people see the Boeing way of doing things as a de facto standard that all manufacturers should follow if the manufacturer doesn't want to get blamed by pilots for behaving in a different way to a Boeing aircraft.
I'm not actually trying to suggest that in a general way. I'll go as far as to suggest it for rudder control - but then I don't see it as a 'Boeing way of doing things' only - since airbus did use it. I'm not trying to go down the road of a B vs. A discussion here, since I acknowledge the opinions of those who have experience on both and say there are specific things that one does better than the other and vica versa. In using the B744 as an example, that's all it is, nothing more, and because it's where my personal experience/knowledge is best. After all, I'm mindful of Boeing's approach to the Colorado Springs accident investigation all those years ago - something which upset more than a few people in the NTSB.
In terms of flight certification, I wonder what gereral line pilot opinion is on the matter with regard to APC susceptiblility. Does anyone else find the approach to it a bit on the subjective side?(potentially at least).
Since this is left completely to the opinion of the test pilot and what he thinks is acceptable/difficult for OTHER 'average' skilled pilots who don't have the same experience base as a test pilot.
While grandfathering of certification is something that makes a lot of people feel uneasy - without it there would be lot less done in the way new aircraft or variations on existing types due to the cost and time needed for full certification. While I think there's some room for tightening up the circumstances in how and when it's allowed - I think it will continue to be the reality for design for a long time to come, and necessarily so.