Originally Posted by
theamrad
Page 24, Section 1.6.2.2 and Page 28, Table 5. It's also in the transcript of the public hearing.
Cheers, will have a nosey.
[UPDATE] Had a nosey. Hmm, been a while since I read this - interesting to note that Douglas's DC-9 and all later derivatives (including 717) also use a variable stop system. Airbus's later aircraft continued to use a variable stop system, albeit slightly less sensitive, so the they did not 'revert' to a Boeing-style variable ratio system after the A300-600/A310. According to the report, the change from a variable ratio to a variable stop system was because of fewer moving parts (therefore reducing failure rate) and projected failure modes being less potentially catastrophic.
Not something that could happen on, for example a B744 - with 80 lbs force needed to get to the stops.
But then, shouldn't the type conversion training take that into account? One of the things that has concerned me is the way people see the Boeing way of doing things as a de facto standard that all manufacturers should follow if the manufacturer doesn't want to get blamed by pilots for behaving in a different way to a Boeing aircraft.
The point is that an A300 will behave differently to a B744, as it has every right to and it is the pilot's job, and the job of those that train the pilot to take those differences into account and make them clear respectively.
I'm in agreement with the spirit of airsupport's statement:
Which is funny, because while it may be harder to do in a Boeing, it's not impossible, and the result would be the same. It's not a de facto MEL so much as a difference in behaviour between types, something that the vast majority of pilots should have no problem with.