PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - Interesting note about AA Airbus crash in NYC
Old 27th Jan 2007, 01:55
  #263 (permalink)  
theamrad
 
Join Date: Feb 2006
Location: Ireland
Age: 52
Posts: 115
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Got a page number handy? Must have missed that nugget...
Page 24, Section 1.6.2.2 and Page 28, Table 5. It's also in the transcript of the public hearing.

Interesting if so, but I still don't think you can blame them entirely - because no matter the system used and no matter how sensitive it is, you don't apply opposite rudder to aileron in a sideslip and then reverse it multiple times.
I'm not trying to argue that point. While I personally believe that the majority of blame should be with the OEM - I don't believe all of it lies there. As far as your last point is concerned - yes that's BAD practice. But I believe from the last point I made in my previous post, that the Board's own 'test' subjects demonstrated an inablility to control the rudder in the manner desired (the "50% condition") as opposed to aileron control. Obviously the fin on (probably) every large transport category aircraft could be overloaded DELIBERATELY - but I think the A310-600 makes it possible to do so INADVERTANTLY. I just don't believe that anyone can state with certainty that the PF intended to or knew he was making FULL reversals. Not something that could happen on, for example a B744 - with 80 lbs force needed to get to the stops.


Originally Posted by AirRabbit
The reason it seems a lot like blame is because it IS blame. It’s just not unfair blame. But, having said that, there certainly isn’t a shortage of blame to go around on this one. Inadequate information available on the airplane; at least as far as the kinds of controller deflection amounts and forces yielding the kinds of control surface deflections achieved. Inadequate regulations; or, at least inadequate understanding of what the regulations say. Inadequate understanding of the aerodynamics involved; at least as far as what was known, what was thought to be known, what was not considered about the rules, and how those rules play out in an airplane. Inadequate training; at least as far as correctly stressing when, if, and how the rudder should be used in recovering from inadvertent upsets. Inadequate follow-up; at least as far as one pilot’s opinion is concerned.

No; there is enough blame available to satisfy almost any one’s prurient interests.
Looks like you think its everyone's fault. Since it seems you don't want to discuss/debate any of my specific points in a rational manner, (and that's kind of my reason is for being here) and would rather get into a personal insults match - I don't have any interest in engaging in juvenile badenage - I've no further comment to make except to say that I'm in agreement with the spirit of airsupport's statement:

Effectively these Aircraft are continuing to operate under a de facto MEL, fit to continue flying as long as control inputs are manually limited.
theamrad is offline