Derv
Thank you for the link. That report has been hard to find.
As you say, very illuminating. Good choice of word, given the criticism of the warning lights and protocols. Doesn’t seem very wise to have to switch off an anti collision device in darkness. Perhaps a pilot would comment? Reading between the lines, and noting the Service Deviation that’s mentioned, this smacks of a Service Engineered Modification that hasn’t been trialled properly. And although it doesn’t use these precise words, the report raises the age old issue of unverified read across between different Mks of aircraft. I can’t see a PE project manager or Westland ticking the box on what the report describes or read across. You’ll probably find this strobe light wasn’t in the trials aircraft. Whatever, they seem very nervous about it, as most references to “HISL” are blanked out.
The report makes numerous recommendations. ADRs. Where have we heard that one before? At least the SK had some form of recorder, although not intended to be crashworthy. In fact, reading the recommendations, I’d say most are complete no-brainers and have probably been recommended in the past but rejected or unfunded.
Although unrelated to the accident, I find para 86 interesting. “It can be assumed JTIDS and Mode 4 IFF were functioning: they are “mission critical items” without which the aircraft captain is unlikely to have launched on the sortie”. If by “functioning” the RN mean a serviceable IFF with all its functions fully integrated with other aircraft systems (and they do), then the board members have been very brave taking this lone stance, contradicting both the RAF and senior MoD/DPA staffs who have ruled this unnecessary. The following day a Tornado was shot down by a Patriot battery. That BOI recommended the Mode 4 IFF be integrated properly.
Agree with your comment about the press. Gone quiet for a couple of days.