Originally Posted by
bomarc
air rabbit...9 seconds is a long time for an experienced airline pilot. about 6 seconds pass from crossing the threshold of a runway to touchdown on a normal landing ( 50' over threshold, 500 fpm descent...you do the math)
and alot happens there. I've certainly taken over from an inexperienced or screwing up copilot in less time than that. I'll bet air support and others have too.
all of you who think it was the pilot...welcome aboard the airbus 300! all 34 in pax service in the usa.
all of you who think that the pilot was shafted...you have lots of other choices!
With all due respect, I am not trying to get into a "one-upsmanship" debate with you. There are quite a few experienced airline veterans here - and I'm sure that more than a fare share of
us have "taken away" an airplane from an inexperienced pilot or one who was in the process of "screwing up," as you say.
But, there are times when things ... happen. As I have said many, many times on this thread - I do NOT desire to lay at the feet of the AA First Officer any more of the responsibility for this particular accident than is deserved. I am sure he was a responsible, well-trained, competent, young man, doing his dead-level best to perform honestly and safely. BUT, as I have also said, many, many times on this thread - he WAS at the controls. He DID make those control inputs - or the Captain did. There isn't any other option. When control inputs of that magnitude are made and are almost instantly reversed with equal magnitude, over and over again ... the aviation community has no business attempting to find fault with the structure of the airplane. If the airplane WAS, indeed, structurally inferior or damaged, so be it ... but I have yet to hear from any responsible aircraft structures expert who believes that such control input/reverse, input/reverse, repetitions would NOT have similar consequences regardless of the aircraft involved. The problem that I see is that after having the critique from the B-727 Captain with whom this young man had flown, regarding the ill-advised use of rudder to control the roll that developed after encountering turbulence, that young man or someone responsible for his training, should have revisited at least
his training and perhaps queried others regarding the same issues. Of course, hindsight is always better focused – and perhaps the circumstances didn’t rise to that level of concern at that time. If true, it certainly is regrettable – as such a misunderstanding about control application can be rather easily corrected with proper education, training, and procedures.
Sometimes Captains get "caught" in the process of letting a responsible and competent F/O continue to fly the aircraft. As evidence, I would submit the following quote from an NTSB report …
In December, 2003, after final approach into Memphis, the First Officer allowed the airplane to to land so hard that the right main landing gear collapsed and the airplane veered off the runway. The aircraft burst into flame.
The airplane had been in a left crab, but was lined up momentarily with the runway, albeit to the left of the centerline, moments before touchdown. However, the flight data recorder (FDR) indicates that the airplane was a bit high and that the aircraft experienced an unusually high vertical speed. As a consequence, the right main landing gear experienced a vertical speed of 14.4 feet per second (fps). This was more than the 12.5 fps experienced by the left main landing gear. The design limit was 10 fps, and the demonstrated reserve energy was 12.0 fps, which the right gear clearly exceeded.
The gear collapsed during the landing rollout, and the plane fell into its right wing, where friction with the ground pulled it to the right and off the runway.
NTSB investigators attribute the accident to improper crosswind and flare techniques by the first officer and the captain's failure to take corrective actions. "The captain remained silent as the approach deteriorated," said NTSB Capt. Dave Kirchgessner. Yet there were signs that the first officer was not coping well, among them that the aircraft was in a left crab and drifting, that control inputs were not sustained, and that there was no flare, he said. The flight, Flight 647, was a check ride for the first officer, who had experienced an altitude deviation on a previous flight. Her technique was being evaluated by the captain, who was serving as both check airman and pilot in command.
As I said, sometimes Captains get "caught" in the process of letting a responsible and competent F/O continue to fly the aircraft, even when the Captain is there specifically to determine IF the F/O
IS responsible and competent.