Originally Posted by
bomarc
regarding, "NO HIGHWAY" by Shute, yes, in some ways it does remind me of the book:
step 1: blame the pilot
...
step 4: have manufacturer demand that plane not be held to blame
step 5: find out that plane was POS clearing pilot.
hmmmm, lessons learned in advance for metal fatigue and something akin to composite problems.
Solution: in the book, fly less than 1500 hours on airframe. in the crash under discussion, just tell the pilots not to do something with the rudder.
I know I'm not Barit1, but I think it's worth pointing out that 'No Highway' was written in 1948, and very much described procedures as they were at the time. The AAIB and NTSB didn't even exist then, and the RAE was the domain of brilliant theoreticians with slide rules and theories. It took the Comet tragedies to highlight the importance of forensic investigation in tandem with the theories and predictions of the 'boffins'.
It's also worth noting that the fictional Dr. Honey's theories in the book, while making for a good story and necessary cautionary tale did not apply in the real world and that the greatest fatigue threat came from pressure cycles, not aircraft velocity.
Without creating a 50 page document on exactly what to do, isn't it better that we all just agree that the proper thing needs to be done? that plane builders build something more robust? that pilots be a little more careful? and that we must all still wonder a bit...maybe, just maybe something failed causing the copilot to wiggle the rudder in such a fashion?
Good points, but the fact remains that the A300 is perfectly robust. The reason that a DC9 is more capable of handling rudder oscillations is a function of the rear-engined design - i.e. you need less rudder travel and a smaller surface area to make a difference than in an aircraft with wing-mounted engines, which has been the prevalent design in almost all large airliners since the 1960s, including those from Douglas and Boeing.
To say that the pilot tended to use more rudder than average and showed a reluctance to engage wake turbulence is not disparaging the man or his skills, he did as he was trained, and as he felt necessary. I don't think any pilot enjoys a wake encounter at slow speed because it has after all caused fatal accidents in the past.
I'll concede that it is difficult to prove conclusively in which order the events happened regarding the rudder pedal reversals and the loss of the stabiliser, but the fact that it wasn't until after the inputs were made that the FDR data for the rudder became unuseable suggests that the inputs were made first.
By saying that, this was a classic 'holes in the cheese' incident. No one factor can be singled out for blame because both the aircraft and the pilot did what their design and training respectively said they would do.