Interesting note about AA Airbus crash in NYC

[Scurvy.D.Dog]

This specific fin did not fail until in excess of twice design load, a margin of 33% over the requirement.

… design load … do you think the design load is right then?
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.. 1.2inches of pedal a couple of times in wake and it failed!

the intent of the regulations is not to eliminate risk - that's impossible - but to reduce it to a level consistent with what's perceived as "safe")

… 1.2inches … full deflection .. wake reversals … 250kts … and it failed unsafe!

How many such inputs, and at what frequency? Make enough full rudder inputs at close to an aircraft response mode frequency and you WILL break any aircraft of conventional design.

.. such inputs as 1.2inches or less and a small number of reversal cycles?
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.. that does not amount to full pedal left and right continuously in other types does it?

This is exactly what the A300 has: structure that didn't fail until it exceeded the regs by 33% (there's your margin),

… AH.. the ‘reg’s’!

an RTL to protect the structure from excessive inputs

.. sorry, I must have missed how that worked in this case?

AND enough rudder to meet the various regs for trim requirements.

… and one would assume asymmetric envelope?!
…. The amount of rudder and its resultant authority is not at issue …. It is the rudder attach, the fin and the fin attach structural resilience to a part of the flight envelope that would not be too difficult to reproduce! ...... that has my full attention!

The simple fact is that the only way to restrict control authority such that no-one can break their aircraft, whatever they do,

... thats is not what I am pondering ... again, is this such an unlikely or agressive reaction to a wake encounter??

is to either detach the pilot entirely from the controls, or to so limit authority as to make the aircraft almost unmanoeuvrable. Or make the structural design requirements so stringent it's too heavy to take off.

… let’s not be silly!