The case of the ageing composite and so much more
Having just spent a long time researching composite construction, I want to throw an unpopular theme into the debate.
Even if we put aside that this aircraft was flying with a manufacturing "cure" fault repaired, there is now surely enough hard evidence - ie the Transat rudder disintergration etc, to now conjecture if there is another reason why the handling pilot was pumping the rudder pedals?
We have been asked to accept that pilot's behaviour, the AA advanced handling training, etc, were the fulcrum behind the handling pilot's response to a wake turbulence induced issue - which then led to the empenage snapping off as a consequence of pilot induced oscilations.
Sorry folks, I no longer buy it. What if the reason the rudder pedals were being pumped was because (a la Transat event) the rudder had begun to disintergrate and detach - resulting in aerodynamic instability - leading to reactive pedal inputs - which are then erroneously blamed as a pilot error cause.
If you doubt the possibility of this potential scenario- go an examine the Transat investigations. You will find that not only did the rudder break up and tear off, it also almost severed the main fin mountings-one side had already begun to tear. It becomes obvious that if the Transat crew had reacted by pumping the pedals, the process would have been completed and another Airbus lost. But they were in the cruise not maneuvering a climb out form JFK.
And all this is without discussing the fitting of one tail design to range of fuselages with differing levels of thrust, polar inertia and airflow. Let alone ageing composites, manufacturing errors and repairs across the entire marque and the mulitple ADs issued about such. Throw in hydrualic actuattor leaks effecting bonding and lamination and electrical effects an you do not even begin to make a 'knock' test of the structure an effective tool.
Sorry folks, but I am not alone in worrying about the ease with which pilot error is being used to smother the very real issues of composites and how Airbus has chosen to use them. And no this is not an anti- Toulouse rant. Its careful factual analysis of a pattern of dysfunction within the design.
Speculation is dangerous, but a repeated pattern of events requires further investigation.