PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - MK Airlines blames others for fatal crash
Old 26th Dec 2006, 07:42
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OverRun
Prof. Airport Engineer
 
Join Date: Oct 2000
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The TSB report is very informative, and a good read. Thanks Phil Space for the link. Two questions come to mind.

1. Should the Boeing BLT be changed? The software has a feature that keeps the previous data/calculations loaded and displayed until it is "re-calculated". The TSB report discusses this at section 2.6:
Anytime after that, if the user opened the weight and balance page, for whatever reason, and returned to the take-off performance page, the planned weight dialogue box would be populated with the take-off weight from the weight and balance page, that is Bradley (240 000 kg). If the user did not know about this feature or did not notice the change and selected "calculate," the V speeds and EPR setting would have been identical to those for take-off from Bradley (see Figure 6).
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I've had this feature appear in other software developed for me; in my case using Visual Basic and an Access database. It allowed similar errors to occur if one was not properly trained – or if one was tired and didn’t recall this exact part of the training. Annoying, but this software was not used in a risky application. However the BLT is.

The Oct 1 issue of Avionics magazine discussed the BLT in an article and made the comment
.The solution would be to amend the software so that a mandatory or willful importation of a figure from the W&B module would be required. For example, a pop-up message instructing crew members to "Click box to import W&B module data," or "Leave box unchecked to enter your own verified all-up-weight figure and center-of-gravity."
. There are probably other ways it can be done, and my thought is that the software should be made more 'fail-safe' in the sense of 'tired user-safe'..

2 Where is the oversight by Transport Canada of the Canadian freight forwarders?. Everyone's suspicion that the cargo weight was greater than assumed was not laid to rest in the TSB report. The issue was dealt with briefly in section 2.3, and with phrases like "unverified cargo weight" in the report, it is a matter that perhaps cannot be fully answered for this flight.

But have TC got a process in place for oversight of cargo weights (or any aviation authority)? It is easy enough to do, and is routine enough in other industries to check weights by audit. Needs a bit of effort and causes dirty hands though, so it not popular with office-bound types. Bring a set of scales around to the airport (it shouldn't have to be said that this should be done unannounced) and check weigh pallets. It may be expeditious to sometimes check-weigh them upon arrival. If the deviation between reported and actual weight are too high, or are always on the one side, the corrective process is easy enough to initiate.
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