Bubbers said :
If my theory is correct about the vertical stab failing initially from the front then the rudder inputs by Sten were probably to correct the stab causing the yaw. He was only trying to maintain heading so multiple reverse inputs would be what any pilot would do if the stab was causing severe yaw problems. If you were the captain would you let him thrash the plane around for a common wake turbulence event? I don't think so. Any flight attendant in the back would be severely injured if she was out of her seat for some reason. We all deal with wake turbulence and it is not an emergency, we just have to make that PA explaining how it is like being behind another boat to calm nervous passengers. A lot of politics was in that NTSB final findings.
Any suststained contact with contemporary systems of "Law" and "Justice" will reveal they, like "legislation" are quite similar to sausage-making:
First grind the source material (facts and information) into barely recognisable fragments, add some seasoning, then pack the results into the desired container (official conclusion). Selection of facts for particular emphasis, inclusion or exclusion of details that support a certain case, even the sequence of presentation and reveal of known information can be massaged to finesse a leaning of meaning in a particular inclination, eventually supporting the conclusion of choice. If the goal is to find truth, then it may be found. If the goal is to conceal truth, then it will be concealed for sure.
If I recall (someone please correct me if wrong - the facts are complex and memory sometimes imperfect late at night), the most important top-level conclusion in the NTSB analysis is that the pilot flying actively and frequently reversed the rudder direction using the pedals. More important, this concept is not had from source data showing his pedal position, but is derived from low-fidelity heavily filtered FDR data on the recording track obtained from the rudder position sensor. Assumed is the premise that the only active cause for changes in position sensor data was the movements of the rudder pedals. The analysis is, therefore, inferring the cause from a partially suspect and very imperfect report of the result - and from this inference is built a framework of cause-effect relationshps using assumptions about how and why the pedals traveled to cause the rudder to move.
The entire analysis is a cascade of suppositions designed to support the final conclusion, heavily reliant on selection of salient facts, including critical facts prepared and information provided (and not provided) by EADS-Airbus, an interested party with immense financial exposure hanging on the outcome.
Not reported but also highly pertinent is the truth that the accident occurs and the final analysis is later put forward in a period of political instability and military concern, when censorship and misinformation from the same government that employs the NTSB are reaching a crescendo in support of perceived strategic imperatives for dealing with some external threats.
The process of requiring full disclosure regarding conflicts of interest is increasingly put upon businessmen and political candidates. Why not also apply this to the bureaucrats? Perhaps in some more enlightened future time, "impartial" reports such as this one could include a soul-searching summary of "External Factors possibly affecting analysis and conclusions in the Final Report".
Suggestions will be welcome for additional reasons why NTSB dropped the ball regarding AA587.