Found it:
http://www.cs.york.ac.uk/hise/safety...2004/0735.html
Jon, you may find this part interesting:
When it came out that the certification standards did not
require anything under dynamic rudder movement (Michael Dornheim
of AvWeek was the first to report this extensively) I was
surprised. Then Clive Leyman, former chief aerodynamicist on
Concorde, pointed out to me that it is very hard to measure
and analyse forces on the rudder under such movements. It is
obviously possible nowadays, with the highly improved codes
that have been made available over the last thirty years since
the airplane was certificated, else Airbus would not have been
able accurately to calculate the overload in this accident.
Airbus could not give the precise load to failure figures on the A300 because the methods of measuring such things were not sufficiently advanced when the A300 series was designed.
And here:
Furthermore, it is documented that
they had been warned, not only by the manufacturer but by the
certification authority in writing, years previously about
such use of the rudder.
(emphasis mine)