Hmm, it would seem there is some kind of problem with the management in ATC as well. I see it mentioned at least twice in the report that 'The comments by the deputy supervisor on duty at the time of the incident suggested a feeling that the controllers believed their only safe option was to refuse to operate aircraft on the reduced length runway at all, but he said to do so would have been seen as dissention, with possible disciplinary consequences.'
So we have controllers who are very "uncomfortable" with aircraft taking off towards vehicles on the runway even though the declared distances have been NOTAMed (inadequately) yet felt unable to apply their skills and experience because some management bods in their ivory towers would have most likely started disciplinary procedures against them. Apparently, their training and skills are irrelevant when it comes to anything that may affect their managements negotiations with the airport to renew the contract and if it is going to affect anything that hits 'profits' it is likely they'll be accused of "dissention".
I don't know about any of you who have read this report but I'm flabbergasted at the glaringly obvious signs of modern management techniques, both in the MAplc and NATS, that show such poor decision making and what appears to be cost saving to the point of lining up all the holes in the Swiss cheese. This was, according to the report, a disaster waiting to happen and was only prevented by sheer good luck.