Del Mode
“1. In the civil world, an airline has to prove to a regulator (CAA?) that it has sufficient funds to carry out its operations and perform necessary maintenance. If it does not then its air operators approval will be withdrawn (I stand by to be corrected).
2. If an airline has an incident or accident it is investigated (by the independent AAIB) to determine the probable cause, identify mitigation and ensure it does not occur again. This is how formal regulation works.
Please tell me how the MoD ensures compliance with 1 and 2?”
I can assure you there are very simple, concise and mandated rules to ensure such compliance for Item 1. I’ve just looked at my old copy and it’s about 15 pages, plus a few appendices dealing with attrition, wastage, RSD&P and such like.
The basic premise underpinning the above is that each item in the inventory is seen to be “owned” by an identified individual whose primary role is to ensure compliance. This is not hundreds of staff, but typically around six for a single Service. Or was when I did it many summers ago. (Probably is hundreds nowadays, given the rampant inefficiency we see every day).
Then reality kicks in, usually in the form of benchmark rulings from on high. Among the better known are, for example, that it is unnecessary to ensure an aircraft or equipment is safe when delivered off contract, or that it can be supported properly through-life or for the aircrew to be trained adequately. That there are relatively few problems in the aircraft world is often not down to routine implementation, but to staffs being prepared to ignore instructions not to implement them.
I’d say the rules governing Item 2 are more robust in their implementation but I still know of cases where the mitigation was identified in advance of the accident, and ignored. Luckily, only one that I can recall was fatal.