My origal post, which I removed because I did not want to get into an argument due to the sensitives of the subject related to
this article and the comment I regarded it as ****-stirring, without amplification. I had replied privately to Mr Smith, for the same reason. He, in reply, accused me of lying as to my reason for withdrawing and for failing to place my reasons here. I now do so.
The implication is that the aircraft is being flown when unsafe. I consider that a slur on both engineers and authorisers. Previous posts have discussed the difference between unserviceability and safety.
The second implication is that aircrew knew it was unsafe, in the period between the crash and the next leak, and resigned in protest at being made to fly it. Whilst that is possible, it implies that, within days of the accident, sufficient was known about the accident to make such decisions. That is not borne out by this thread.
The thrown in anonymous comment regarding a startling "lack of care" raises the accusation to the level of culpable negligence.
It may or not be true that the Nimrod has a deficient fuel tank fire prevention system, or that it requires one in its operating envelope and based on previous incidents, or that one is feasible. But the implication, again, is that the omission of one is a further proof the aircraft is unsafe.
Pending the result of the BOI, and with AAR already suspended, I regarded the article's claim the aircraft continues to be unsafe as unproven, alarmist, insulting to those involved and likely to be distressing to the families of those on the fleet.