A reader gave me a link to NATO's Website, one that links to a September 12 2006 Press Conference given by NATO about their intention to purchase Boeing C-17s.
It is here:
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s060912a.htm
I was shocked to read it. It looks just like what is going on here in Canada in several aspects.
An unidentified journalist from the News Agency of Ukraine asks :
"need some additional (inaudible)... so let me ask my question. My question is, why Boeing? So was there any open tender announced and why Boeing was chosen, not any other(?) producer. And another part of the question (inaudible)..., after the project will be finalized does mean that NATO cooperation with these other partners, (inaudible)... for example, will be reduced?"
Marshall S. Billingslea, Assistant Secretary General for Defence Investment, replied:
"Good question and let me clarify. This was not one of these things where NATO suddenly went sole-source to one particular company. This decision today, the announcement today and the release of the LOI today in fact is the result of more than a year of analysis conducted into the economics and the capabilities associated with long range air-to-air refuelable outsize cargo lift.
In other words, when you are looking at that class of aircraft we came to the conclusion that there are three different airframes in existence today which are in that class. One of them airframes if the Antonov 124, which a number of nations operate, and which are also available for leasing and contracting on the commercial market.
The C-17 aircraft is another one that's in that class, which is not available today, to my knowledge, for commercial lease. Only for acquisition. And then the C-5 aircraft is the grandfather of outsize cargo strategic lift and that is certainly another aircraft that we know is in the class.
But there are no other aircraft in existence today with those kinds of specifications.
Now as you may know, NATO has been focusing on the shortfall associated with strategic lift for some time, and NATO, in fact, moved forward to cement a deal with one of those aircraft, the Antonov 124 already. So we have over the past several years, resulting in an actual lease arrangement with the SALIS initiative a standing flying hour contract with Antonovs for 2000 flying hours and several nations in that.
So you have already NATO and several of those nations working with the Antonov. The C-5 was a plane that we looked at, but decided, for a number of reasons, to turn our attention instead to the C-17, because that was the only other available lifter in this class, and you see now today NATO moving forward to start the negotiations for an arrangement on the C-17.
So the way you need to look at this is that NATO is, in fact, already trying to diversify the different kinds of air lifters that we have. We've got the Antonovs. Now we would like to get an additional kind of airframe. And this gets back to Nick's question, that is why you should precisely expect that we're going to be open to further airframes when additional kinds of lifters are fielded by different companies.
This initiative today, to create the NATO Strategic Airlift Capability in no way says anything about the SALIS arrangement. It certainly does not prejudge any aspect of that arrangement. We need those flying hours on the Antonovs and we continue to expect that the nations are going to use those flying hours and many NATO allies are big, big consumers of Antonov flying hours for military missions.
So there is, even with this acquisition, there is more demand than there is supply on the market."
I'd like to make a few comments on this reply.
First of all, Mr Billingslea says that they looked only at air-to-air refuelable aircraft. This would seem to eliminate the AN-124 wouldn't it? However, what use is there in having an aircraft with an Air-to-Air refuelable capability if there is no aircraft capable of refuelling it in the air?. This is the case of the UK, which leased 4 C-17 which are technically refuelable in the air. However, not only does the Lease contract between Boeing and the UK forbid such refuelling but there presently is no aircraft in the UK’s inventory that is capable of refuelling the C-17 in the air.
In the case of NATO, it will take US aircraft to refuel the C-17s.
Then Mr Billingslea adds that there are no other aircraft in that category. NATO, like Canada, seems to have amnesia when it comes to the existence of the Ilyushin 76MF-90. Unless their definition of “outsize” excludes an aircraft with 400 cubic meters of freight hold volume, and a 60 ton payload?
About the C-17, Mr Billingslea says:
“it is a fairly incredible machine, which can fly long distances, including, of course, an air-to-air refuelling capability. It can land without much of a runway. It can land on short runways, on dirt runways. And it can transport huge quantities of troops, or hardware, helicopters or tanks, special operations forces and what have you”
This is also a fair description of the Ilyushin 76. Although the standard IL-76MF does not have an air-to-air refuelling capacity by choice, the Beriev A-50 Mainstay, which is based on an IL-76 airframe, does. Any customer who would want an IL-76MF with a refuelling probe, could get one. I must add that there is also an Air-to-Air refueller version of the IL-76, the IL-78 Midas that NATO is well aware of. By having both, NATO could not only have the strategic aircraft but also its refueller, something it presently does not have.
This process looks identical to the one going on in Canada.
1) A Strategic Airlifter is being purchased without any form of open bidding
2) The Boeing C-17 is chosen
3) The existence of the Tashkent built Strategic Airlifter, the IL-76, of which over 960 have been built, and which is still in production is “forgotten” by NATO as a possible contender against the Boeing C-17
Are we certain the Cold War is really over?
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
A few notes on Mr Billingslea, taken right off the NATO Website.
Prior to assuming the position of ASG(DI) in January, 2004, Marshall Billingslea served as the Acting Assistant U.S. Secretary of Defense for Special Operations / Low-Intensity Conflict. As such, he was the principal civilian advisor to the U.S. Secretary of Defense on Special Operations Forces and counter-terrorism efforts against al’Qaida and other terrorist groups. Mr. Billingslea had overall responsiblity for the supervision of all special operations activities of the Department of Defense, and served as the Co-Chairman of the Board of Directors of U.S. Special Operations Command. In November, 2003, Mr. Billingslea received from Secretary Rumsfeld the Medal for Distinguished Public Service for his work in counter-terrorism.
Prior to that, Mr. Billingslea was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Negotiations Policy – the U.S. Secretary of Defense’s chief negotiator for all major international agreements. He was the principal DoD representative on numerous U.S. arms control delegations, and the U.S. Head of Delegation for Transparency and Verification negotiations with the Russian Federation in connection with the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Nuclear Reductions.
Before joining Secretary Rumsfeld’s Pentagon staff, Mr. Billingslea served for over six years as the Senior Professional Staff Member for National Security Affairs on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He was the senior advisor to the Chairman and members of the Committee on all proliferation, arms control, defense, intelligence, and counter-terrorism issues within the Committee’s purview. Further, Mr. Billingslea conducted day-to-day oversight of the U.S. arms sales process, and was responsible for reviewing and approving all exports licensed under the U.S. Munitions List and the Arms Export Control Act.
Not exactly an impartial person is it?