Imagine the chaos with a gaggle of Hercs, Harriers, Sentinels etc sat on some brass-hats capacious lawn while some other poor bugger in a different AOR is crying out for air.......
This is exactly what happend in South Vietnam within months of the Americans leaving the ARVN to run the show themselves. Every divisional commander demanded and got his own private air force, and the result was all too predictable - fragmented air assets which were refused to neighbouring ground formations because they might be needed sometime later by the ground commander who had them under his direct command. (And besides, they looked good on the lawn outside his HQ and made him feel important.)
On to a far more controveresial point, (and one that I'm sure will elicit howls of outrage from some quarters in Australia), look what happened when the Australians handed over all their rotary wing assets to the Army. For years, almost the whole fleet of Blackhawks languished on the ground for want of scheduled service, because the Army treated the choppers as trucks. (For quite some time, only three aircraft were serviceable from the whole fleet.)
And then the perdictable happened - the tragic crash in Townsville when two Blackhawks meshed rotors on a night exercise and the best part of a SAS Troop were killed.
I'm sure there'll be some who'll correct me on the details, but in a nutshell, the ground force commander decided to amend the operational procedures that had been practised in daylight, in particular, the formation they would adopt and the route they should fly. The more junior air element commander, also Army, unwilingly agreed to the changes, where a junior offer from a separate service could have safely said 'no' with no reprucussions to his career - as had happened on numerous occasions in the past when senior Army officers attempted to micromanage an air op. (And this was the main reason so many senior Army officers wanted control of the helo force.)