Modtinbasher
21 years ago, the Naval Air Radio Stores Integration (NARSI) initiative was in full flow. Aims were exactly the same as the ones you list. RN had to close their stores and workshops at Copenacre. RAF suppliers took over commodity management, but the workshop capability (2nd line filter) was lost forever.
Copenacre had four staff (EO, plus 3 AOs) managing all air radio spares, including main LRUs and test equipment. At a conservative guess, they were replaced with about 30 staff at Harrogate, with a raft of Sqn Ldrs, Wg Cdrs and Gp Capts in charge. And the RAF had a lesser stores computer system (4/72).
Wasted tens, if not hundreds, of millions – scrapped much needed spares, bought duplicates for kit which had gone out of service. You name it, they mismanaged it. Crucified by auditors, whom they ignored. And because the filter benches were lost, the no fault found rate rocketed at 3rd and 4th line – more waste, causing outstanding demands at first line. And they never did get the hang of the concept of a ship being at sea for 6 months, or their storing demands. I remember Gannet (Prestwick, Scotland) was signalled by Harrogate to send a spare LRU they had to Ark Royal – by Red Star, overnight, to arrive 0900 next day. OK if it’s between RAF stations, but Ark was half way between Hong Kong and Sydney. “OK, we’ll fly it out by Herc”. “And land where?” “Well, it’s an aircraft carrier isn’t it, we’ll land on”. “Can’t”. “We’ll airdrop it”. They never did learn.