BOAC it would be futile to quibble over1-2 sec while the aircraft is rolling to a stop, I am sure that we both appreciate that not delaying the evacuation is important and the decision will depend on the situation; – lets not debate the words as are there are more interesting issues.
We have different views of the uniqueness of the Manchester accident; it was a rare uncontained engine failure and a severe fuel leak which resulted in a pool of burning fuel; even individually these events are rarely seen in what are already rare events (RTO).
Re your “>>… it is not just 'chuck them out' regardless since injuries will occur if you do. There is often a period of evaluation required, even following a fire warning. Such does not require an 'automatic' immediate evacuation. <<
It would be interesting to understand what you would evaluate, why, and when these items are considered in deciding to opt for an evacuation.
If the aircraft is in a situation that requires an evacuation, then the decision to evacuate is self evident. A fire outside the engine or within the cabin could be such a situation – automatic – predetermined by SOP/company policy.
The thread discusses an RTO with an engine fire (a fire warning). The advice to turn may be specific to rare situations, but if it can be incorporated in generic SOPs (turn for all fire warning RTOs) without detriment, then it can be a positive safety aspect.
A concern would be having a drill specific to one situation so that alternative drills would be required for other similar situations; this could increase crew workload in situation assessment and decision making. Do operators do this unwittingly? Do pilots also do this unwittingly by attempting to ‘double think’ all situations – requiring an evaluation period. In my experience of surprising and potentially stressful situations, the crew workload should be kept as low as possible; this can be achieved with good SOP design and controlled thinking behaviour - strong mental discipline.